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Many authors talk about the rising power of China and the "China threat." One area
where conflict has frequently been predicted is in China's pursuit of energy security. This
thesis explores China's energy situation, options available to meet rising demand,
environmental impact of these options, and possible ways to mitigate these effects. The
thesis then determines to what extent China will be unable to meet its needs from
domestic sources and have to look overseas. Then, a review of China's most likely
overseas suppliers will explain where China's actions could be threatening to U.S.
interests, and where fears are overblown. The areas where concern is most warranted is
in China's increasing dependence on imports for its oil needs, and its continued reliance
on coal usage. The desire to ensure secure oil supplies has led China to deal with Iran
and Iraq, despite U.S. desires to isolate these nations. China is also increasing its
influence throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, South America, and retains claims in
the South China Sea. While actions in these regions are not necessarily threatening, U.S.
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There has been extensive literature in recent years about the rising power of China
and what this means for the United States. "China threat" writers cover a wide range of
activities in China and attempt to show how the U.S. and China are heading towards
conflict. While these authors raise some valid points, they seem to be searching for a
threat where one may not exist.
However, one tangible area of possible conflict is in energy. Most of the
industrialized world's energy comes from finite resources. These sources are very
important to U.S. interests and, as the Persian Gulf war demonstrated, the U.S. is
prepared to go to war to protect them. China has long been viewed as the last frontier for
capitalism with her 1.26 billion "consumers" waiting for modern products. At long last,
some of these dreams might be coming true. China is becoming increasingly involved in
the world economy, something that most observers see as positive. Where the concern
arises is when China's growth and U.S. growth cannot both be sustained due to limited
energy sources.
This concern has been highlighted in numerous recent articles, which raise the
concept of energy security. This can be generally defined as ensuring that a country has a
consistent, uninterruptible, and affordable supply of energy sufficient to meet its national
objectives for the foreseeable future. In the case of China, affordability is subordinate to
security. Demonstrating the policies China is pursuing to obtain energy supplies will
show that price appears to be unimportant to China as they aggressively outbid Western
oil companies to obtain oil rights in Central Asia and South America. This attitude
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derives from what China has called the "century of shame." During this period of
"unequal treatment" and domination by outside powers, China developed a strong sense
of insecurity, and a desire to avoid future Western influence. This is a driving principle
in China's current foreign relations, and is reflected in its energy policies.
The increasing importance of energy security to the U.S. was reflected in April
1995 when the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University
conducted a strategic forum on energy security. In the forum's summary, three
recommendations were made, two of which are important here. The number one concern
was that the "U.S. government needs to pay close attention to long-term prospects for
Chinese oil imports" reflecting that country's growing importance. The second
recommendation indicated the importance of Persian Gulf oil to U.S. needs in stating that
the U.S. must have a robust capability to defend this oil from any threat. This seems to
set the stage for potential conflict between the U.S. and China over energy. The
likelihood of any such conflict occurring can be determined by a thorough review of
China's energy options.
This thesis explores two possible future scenarios for China's energy industry:
high and low growth. The general trend is that if low growth occurs, China's actions will
likely continue on a course quite similar to the one apparent today. There will be some
changes in the energy sector, but overall needs can be met. If the high growth occurs,
China will be faced with drastically increased oil and gas imports, and Beijing may fear
the security implications that result from this dependence. This scenario could lead to
tensions in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South China Sea.
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Fortunately, while China's economy is still growing, the rate of growth appears to
be slowing. At the same time, the country is emphasizing efficiency and conservation.
These efforts will help reduce the overall demand for energy supplies and slow the rate of
growth in the energy industry. This makes the low growth scenario the most likely to
occur. Even so, there will be an increase in demand for oil and gas imports that will have
China interacting more frequently in world energy markets. Where there is interaction,
there is always the possibility for disagreements. The U.S. must be sensible in dealing
with China to keep Beijing comfortable with dependence on the world market. If
disagreements are allowed to become conflicts, any alternative avenues that China may
be likely to choose will be much more damaging to U.S. interests.
In the next few years, China's energy situation will evolve slightly. Oil is
becoming increasingly important, and its share of TCEC will likely increase. This
increase will be met by imports. Natural gas will also increase its share ofTCEC though
very slowly. This could be accelerated, and most observers would like to see this done.
The main barrier to this is China's emphasis on security above other concerns. This has
led to actions that prevent China's indigenous gas industry from realizing its potential.
These fuels will be in such high demand for industrial, transportation, and residential uses
that they will not be available to assume greater shares of electrification.
The U.S. can assist China in meeting future energy needs by further encouraging
American firms to participate in hydropower and nuclear plant construction. These are
two areas that stand a realistic chance of increasing their percentage of TCEC, thereby
reducing usage of coal. If planned goals are met in these two areas, the need to bum
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almost 70 Mtons of coal per year will be averted. These offer the best short-term chance
for lessening China's impact on the environment. Fears of proliferation from peaceful
nuclear power need to be overcome, and actions taken to encourage the growth of these
industries. While many in the U.S. would like to see the role of nuclear power
diminished in favor of natural gas power, this is not going to happen for many years in
China. The U.S. should relax restrictions on technology transfers for such items as high
capacity power turbines, which can allow China to meet demand.
In summary, then, this thesis advocates an extension of current Clinton
administration approaches to China. Engagement is obviously the only real option. The
question then becomes what form of engagement. Specifically, the U.S. must be as
pragmatic as Beijing is becoming. China is going to get the energy it needs because this
is a priority to the government. The U.S. has the power to treat China like a friend and
help guide that country's transition to market dependence. Like all friendships,
disagreement is inevitable, but this does not have to scuttle the benefits of continued
relations. If the U.S. chooses to emphasize the differences between the two countries,
and attempts to coerce China into desired behavioral patterns, the chance of success is
slim. Nor are such efforts necessary. China is slowly evolving, and further engagement
in the world economy can only accelerate this.
China's actions are not necessarily threatening to U.S. interests. The two largest
areas of concern are meeting China's future oil needs, and reducing the environmental
impact of the country's increasing coal usage. China's current path can address both of
these concerns. A developed China is in everyone's interests, as this represents a large
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prosperous market. It also means that China will be more likely to transition to modern
manufacturing methods and newer power plant designs which will reduce environmental
degradation. But changes like these will only occur if China feels secure in relying on
world markets for energy, most notably for oil. If the U.S. and other countries see
China's growth as threatening, China will likely react by retrenching in traditional
methods and by pursuing claims in the South China Sea and other areas.
The U.S. must take the lead in helping China to find its way in the future energy
market by helping to increase that country's confidence in market solutions. The true
challenge will be in ensuring that policies are in place to continue such cooperation over
a change of administration. This is where the Clinton administration must strive to build
bipartisan support for engagement with China to prevent it from becoming a political




There has been extensive literature in recent years about the rising power of China
and what this means for the United States. "China threat" writers cover a wide range of
activities in China and attempt to show how the U.S. and China are heading towards
conflict. A popular example of this school of thought can be found in Bernstein and
Munro's The Coming Conflict With China. 1 This book and others show how China is
likely to use her growing economic power to influence world affairs in ways that threaten
U.S. interests. Numerous other authors have picked up on the power of China's economy
and continue this theme. One of the best known of these is Samuel Huntington, who
wrote primarily about the threat of Japan's economic might in "Why International
Primacy Matters," but developed the theme further to include China in "The Clash of
Civilizations."2
While all of these works contain some valid points, they are searching for a threat
where one doesn't have to exist. Much of the blame for any conflict that occurs between
the U.S. and China will rest with America as policies the U.S. government takes in the
near future have the power to effect the likelihood of any conflict. This is not to imply
1 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict With China, First Vintage Edition (New
York: Vintage Books, 1998).
2 Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," in The Cold War and After: Prospects for
Peace, expanded edition, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
307-327, and "The Clash of Civilizauons?," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. This theme
was later expanded and released as the book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
(Simon & Shuster, 1996).
that it is America's job to manage world growth, but one aspect of this growth that could
lead to conflict is meeting growing energy needs. Most of the industrialized world's
energy comes from finite resources.3 These sources are very important to U.S. interests
and, as the Persian Gulf war demonstrated, the U.S. is prepared to go to war to protect
them.4
China has long been viewed as the last frontier for capitalism with her 1 .26 billion
"consumers" waiting for modern products. At long last, some of these dreams might be
coming true. China is becoming increasingly involved in the world economy, something
that most observers see as positive. 5 Where the concern arises is when China's growth
and U.S. growth cannot both be sustained due to limited energy sources. This concern
3 Finite in this sense primarily means short-term. As Sarah A. Emerson points out in "Resource Plenty:
Why Fears of an Oil Crisis are Misinformed," Energy Security Analysis, Inc. (ESAI), Available [Online]:
http://www.esai.com/oilcrisiJitm [November 10, 1998], the amount of actual available oil not only expands
every year, it does so at a rate that generally exceeds expectations. This means that long-term opportunities
exist for countries to obtain needed energy. Nevertheless, they are finite for practical purposes because to
guarantee supply, countries enter into supply agreements upon which they then depend. A disruption in a
major supply stream can have very real security implications, despite overall world oil abundance. Further,
worldwide reserves are not necessarily collocated with centers of world demand, meaning that international
arrangements and trade agreements are necessary to redistribute needed oil. These are subject to
disruptions from crises that may initiate in countries not involved in the supply chain. This increases
impetus among countries to diversify supplies and find "secure" sources.
4 The official justification for the U.S. intervention in the war was to answer Iraq's aggression against
Kuwaiti sovereignty. While this is a true reason, it could be argued that had Kuwait not been an important
source of oil for the U.S., events may have unfolded differently.
5 There has been much written about the virtues of economic liberalism and interdependence. A good
analysis of these schools of thought can be found in Robert Gilpin, "Dependence and Economic
Development,"from The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1987) in Classic Readings of International Relations, eds. Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein, and Jay
M. Shafritz (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), 440-459. For an analysis of the
difficulty in attempting to apply economic interdependence theory to China, see Denny Roy, "Hegemon on
the Horizon?," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149-168, specifically 156-160.
has been highlighted in numerous articles, including Yergin, Eklof, and Edwards'
"Fueling Asia's Recovery," and Calder's "Asia's Empty Tank."6
These articles raise the concept of energy security, which can be generally defined
as ensuring that a country has a consistent, uniterruptible, and affordable supply of energy
sufficient to meet its national objectives for the foreseeable future. In the case of China,
affordability is subordinate to security. Examining the policies China is pursuing to
obtain energy supplies will show that price appears to be relatively unimportant to China
as it aggressively outbids Western oil companies to obtain oil rights in Central Asia and
South America.
Energy Security began to assume some of its current significance in the wake of
the oil crisis in the 1970's. The desire among the developed countries to prevent any
future oil supply disruptions led to the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
At that time, the emphasis was almost exclusively on the security of oil supplies. This
has evolved over the last 25 years. As Robert Priddle, Executive Dierector of IEA, stated:
More recently, energy security has become more widely defined.
Security of oil and gas supply remain vital. But sensitivity to the
environmental consequences of energy production, transport, and use are
today no less an aspect of energy security: insensitivity to legitimate
environmental concerns could certainly put at risk that unabated supply of
energy on which we rely for economic activity.7
6 Kent E. Calder, "Asia's Empty Tank," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (Mar 1996): 55-69; Daniel Yergin,
Dennis Eklof, and Jefferson Edwards, "Fueling Asia's Recovery," Foreign Affairs 11, no. 2 (Mar-Apr
1998): 34-50. See also and Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia," Survival 39, no. 3 (Autumn
1997): 85-106, and Mamdouh G. Salameh, "China Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict," Survival 37, no.
4 (Winter 1995-96): 133-146.
7 Robert Priddle, "The World Energy Outiook Security of Supply in a Liberalised Market," speech
delivered to the Handelsblatt Conference on the German Energy Market (January 22, 1997), Available
[Online]: http://www.iea.org/new/speeches/priddle/1997/pgermany.htm.
The increasing importance of this concept to the U.S. was highlighted in April
1995 when the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University
conducted a strategic forum on energy security. In the forum's summary, three
recommendations were made, two of which are important here. The number one concern
identified was that the "U.S. government needs to pay close attention to long-term
prospects for Chinese oil imports" reflecting that country's growing importance. The
second recommendation indicated the importance of Persian Gulf oil to U.S. needs in
stating that the U.S. must have a robust capability to defend this oil from any threat. 8
The question that this thesis will examine is whether China's pursuit of energy
security will be threatening to U.S. interests, and if so, what actions can the U.S. take to
reduce that threat. To begin an examination of energy security in China, this thesis will
attempt to ascertain what China's goals or objectives are. This will be accomplished by a
review of Chinese historical legacies that are behind the current development drive,
which will explain the importance of development to Beijing and demonstrate the
tenacity China is likely to display in enabling economic growth. That will then lead to an
examination of China's economy to determine if this desire for growth is achievable, and
if so, what this means for growing energy needs. That information will highlight the
scope of the possible problem of energy security, or if any problem exists. As the size of
China's growing demand becomes apparent, this thesis will examine the environmental
implications of China's current energy usage, as this is one area of potential conflict in
° Patrick Clawson, "Energy and National Security," Strategic Forum no. 26, INSS, National Defense
University, (April 1995), from the NDU web page: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ forurn26.html.
China's energy future. From that point, an examination of China's current and likely
future energy options will reveal how much energy China will have to obtain from
beyond its borders. This is where China and the U.S. may find conflicting interests.
Once the scope of this possible conflict is determined, some policy recommendations can
be made to mitigate or remove any sources of tension.
Once completed, this review will show that China's likely future course will have
an increasing impact on U.S. and world interests. The largest area of concern will be
China's aggressive pursuit of world oil supplies, which could lead to tension. China is
almost obsessed with security, to the point that it frequently outbids competitors for oil
and gas reserves by 30-50%. These actions frequently resulted in U.S. firms losing out.
Secondary to this, but increasingly important, is the tremendous potential environmental
impact of China's growing coal usage. Minimizing the problems of both of these will
require some judicious U.S. policy choices that may not be politically popular.

H. HISTORICAL LEGACIES
A. THE MIDDLE KINGDOM AND THE "CENTURY OF SHAME"
Much of modern Chinese behavior is strongly influenced by history. China has a
long and colorful past with many experiences that effect policy today. A central period in
this history has been called the "century of shame" or "century of humiliation." This was
a period in which the traditional Chinese view of the world and China's place in that
world met head on with competing Western concepts.
Prior to that point, China had occupied a central position in Asia, and to the
Chinese, the world. This feeling of centrality goes back to the traditional belief of China
as "the Middle Kingdom." In this view, China was the center of the world and was
surrounded by "barbarians." The further one was from the center, the less civilized.
Traditional Chinese foreign policy placed "states" in a hierarchy with China at the top,
and all others subordinate, a position they acknowledged by paying tribute to the emperor.
This idea did not accommodate European views of the world and the concept of
the equality of nations. When Western nations began encroachments in Asia, China did
not seem concerned, because they were seen as unimportant. The Europeans' main
concern was with trade, an occupation that Confucian thought felt was beneath
gentlemen.9 In the past, any outsider who seemed threatening to China was eventually
absorbed into Chinese culture, and the Chinese expected this to happen to the Europeans
9 As Confucious said, "...[a] gentleman takes as much trouble to discover what is right as lesser men take to
discover what will pay." William E. Soothill, (translator), The Analects of Confucius (London: Oxford
University Press, 1 958), IV: 1 6.
as well. This attitude started to change when British traders began bringing opium to
China in large quantities to try and make their imperial efforts profitable. Opium began
to be seen as a threat to Chinese society, and the Manchu emperor, determined to end this
"plague," appointed Lin Ze-Xu as imperial commissioner in Guangzhou to eradicate the
opium trade. The British did not passively accept the resulting loss of revenue, and in
1839-1842 they forced China to accept British trade in what has been termed the First
Opium War. 10 This began the "century of shame" and over the next hundred years,
China's view of the superiority of their culture met reality. Time after time, China would
lose in competitions with outside powers and suffer losses of sovereignty and repeated
humiliations. 11
Some subsequent incidents include the Arrow War or Second Opium War (1858-
1860), a series of "unequal" treaties with many Western powers, further opening to trade,
loss of influence in the region as a result of imperialist advances, and the forced granting
of extraterritoriality to Europeans in Chinese cities. The resulting weakened Emperor
was then faced with internal uprisings from the Taiping and Nien Rebellions, and
suffered further humiliation at the hands of a fellow Asian nation, Japan, in the Sino-
10 There had been numerous imperial decrees attempting to end China's opium problem in the century
leading up to the Opium War. None of these, however were successful, and the appointment of Lin Ze-Xu
was the first effective measure. For an overview of the role of Opium in China and the resulting Opium
Wars, see Ranbir Vohra, China 's Path to Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present,
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 33-38, and 45-51. See also J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams:
Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1858-1860) in China, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
1 1 For an excellent review of Chinese concepts of centrality and the effects of the "century of shame"
on these ideas, see William C. Kirby, "Traditions of Centrality, Authority, and Management in Modern
China's Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robinson
and David Shambaugh, (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1995), 13-29.
Japanese War. 12 The scars of this conflict still remain, as this resulted in the ceding of
Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. That island remained in Japanese hands
until 1945, and once occupied by the KMT in 1949, its control has continued to elude the
CCP.
After the war, the authority of the state continued to decline and when the Qing
dynasty officially ended in 1911, China decayed into a period of warlordism and civil
war. During this period, Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang (KMT) party formed a Nationalist
government, and battled against Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for
control of China. The KMT was seen by the CCP as a fascist regime that was "almost
more foreign than Chinese and inherently traitorous." 13 The KMT was unable to either
quell internal disorder, or to withstand the rising tide of Japanese militarism in the 1930's
and China suffered another humiliation as the Japanese occupied the country.
Following World War U, the conflict continued as the KMT resumed fighting
with Mao's communists for control over China and the right to claim the historical
mantle of Chinese greatness. The century of shame came to an end in 1949 with the
victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the flight of the Nationalists to Taiwan.
12 This is not to imply that all the blame for the Emperor's weakness belongs to the Europeans.
Indeed, the Qing Dynasty was already in decline and was having difficulties exercising power before the
British arrived. This outside threat merely accelerated the decline.
13 Kirby, 13.
B. THE COMMUNIST ERA
Mao Zedong rose to power and proclaimed an end to the century of shame by
saying that at last, China had "stood up" to the West. The CCP was billed as the saviors
of Chinese history who delivered the country from the position of "semi-colony." Mao
claimed that China had always been a great nation that had fallen behind "entirely due to
oppression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary
governments." 14 In a drive to right this "injustice" the CCP became synonymous with
self-reliance and the avoidance of any future Western influence and humiliation. Mao
took self-reliance to the extreme with disastrous campaigns like the Great Leap Forward
and the Cultural Revolution. 15 The result was that China saw itself falling further behind,
and fear of humiliation increased rather than lessened.
This set the stage for the rise of Deng Xiaoping who, being more pragmatic than
Mao, recognized the technical superiority of Western nations and decided to use their
knowledge to aid China. This was essentially a reincarnation of the traditional ti yong
philosophy of using western learning "for use" and Chinese experience for the "base" or
essence. 16 This is not a new idea, as this was the goal behind the self-strengthening
14 Mao Zedong, Selected Works, vol v (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977), 22, as quoted in
Kirby, 13.
15 For a detailed accounting of the Great Leap Forward, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the
Cultural Revolution, vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960, (Great Britain: Columbia University
Press, 1983). An overview of the Cultural Revolution can be found in Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and
After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 309-434.
16 Bruce Cummings, "The World Shakes China," The National Interest, no. 43 (Spring 1996): 34.
10
movement of the nineteenth century, which had been intended to fend off the original
Western encroachments. It is likely that only after the depths of the century of shame
provided a break with rigid Confucian thought, could China successfully apply these
ideas.
C. MODERN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
Today, the CCP has drifted from devout emphasis on ideology and has clung to
the success of China's economy as justification for many policies. Many principles have
been sacrificed to advance China's position in the world, but the underlying current has
been to avoid outside dominance over China and to attempt to restore China's greatness.
This is logical for a party that justifies its monopolization of power as being the "party
that led China out of the 'century of shame'."17
One principle that remains, is the importance of sovereignty to the Chinese
leaders. This is an offshoot of the historical experiences described above, and it means
that the Chinese are adamant about self-determination and noninterference in what they
see as internal affairs. Harold Hinton puts sovereign dignity as second only to security in
Beijing's most important external concerns. 18 Many other ideological objectives have
lessened in significance, and while the party still espouses to be heading towards an
I 7 Denny Roy, "The Foreign Policy of Great Power China," Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 2
(Sept 1997): 123.
1° Harold C. Hinton, "China as an Asian Power," in Robinson and Shambaugh, 348-372, specifically,
349.
11
eventual communist society, in practice, the Chinese idea of market socialism is looking
very capitalistic.
Actual goals of the government seem to have little to do with the once vaunted
communist revolution and are more nationalistic. The over-arching objective other than
restoring Chinese greatness, seems to be retaining the CCP's hold on power. Everything
today comes down to contributing to China's wealth and power. 19 Hinton sees the main
domestic objective as economic development as key to ensuring Chinese greatness and
independence. 20 In more specific terms, Nathan and Ross see three goals of Chinese
foreign policy, all of which show the "baggage of history."21
The first goal is to restore and maintain territorial integrity. This is to undo the
last physical vestiges of the century of shame and prevent any future losses of territory.
This has become an obsessive goal to the point that no modern Chinese leader could
19 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for
Security (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 27. This is not to imply that this quest for power
can explain everything. This is the approach that many proponents of realist international relations theory
would take. For examples of the classical realist school of thought, which traces its roots back to the
writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli, see Hans J. Morgenthau, "Six Principles of Political Realism" from
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5 th ed. (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4-6, 8-
12, as reprinted in Classic Readings of International Relations, 34-38. The strongest proponent of
structural realism is Kenneth Waltz. See "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," from The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 39-52, as reprinted in Classic Readings of International
Relations, 39-47. Also Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus 93, no. 3 (Summer
1964), 881-887, 899-902, 907-909, as reprinted in Classic Readings of International Relations, 62-68. To
truly understand Chinese behavior, one must look beyond the limits of any simple theory. China's behavior
is affected by many "variables," and one of the most significant that these theories tend to discount is the
influence of history. For more on this see Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs
75, no. 5 (Sep-Oct 1996): 36-52, and Nathan and Ross.
20 Hinton, 349.
21 The goals are in The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, 16. The term "baggage of history" is from
Denny Roy, 125.
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politically survive giving up important territory like Taiwan, Tibet, or islands in the South
China Sea.22 Nathan and Ross's second goal relates to China reclaiming her traditional
position as the Middle Kingdom, at least in Asia. This is the goal of preventing any other
power from dominating the region. Chinese leaders believe that any power that comes to
dominate Asia will likely attempt to dominate China, which as has been shown, will not
be allowed. The third goal is to create a favorable environment for economic growth.
Only by continuing to grow the Chinese economy, can China catch up with and surpass
Western powers, escape the image of the "sickman of Asia," and return to greatness.
Another attempt to determine China's national objective or goals reveals the same
historical baggage. This can be found in a speech by Kenneth Lieberthal given in October
1997. 23 Lieberthal gave a brief overview of the century of shame and then tied this in to
what he saw as China's goals. This history, according to Lieberthal, shapes Chinese
thought in the modern era. Determined to avoid any future "unequal" treatment, Chinese
leaders see the opportunity finally presenting itself for China to resume her "rightful"
position as a great power. This intent is reflected in the goals he outlined. He listed
China's number one objective as a desire for national unity. This means "overcoming the
dismemberment of the country that was imposed on them by stronger powers that were
22 While, there have been instances of China giving up territory, these instances were in areas not seen
as vital, and more importantly, these concessions were made by Mao. It is not widely believed that any
modern Chinese leader is secure enough in his position to be able to make such a bold move. For a
discussion of this topic and examples of where Mao made territorial concessions, see Nathan and Ross,
particularly 115-118.
23 Kenneth Lieberthal, "China-Domestic Issues, Economic Energy and Security," Vital Speeches of the
Day 64, no. 3 (Nov 15, 1997): 75-76.
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more economically developed over the past century and more."24 This is essentially
Nathan and Ross's goal of maintaining territorial integrity.
The second objective is economic development. This shows that "they recognize
that national strength that brought them low was based on more rapid economic
development in other countries."25 This is seen as the key to overcoming the unequal
status, and economic growth will play a key role in determining China's actions in the
coming years. Again, there is a marked similarity to Nathan and Ross's list. The third
national objective, according to Lieberthal, is a desire for social and political stability.
These are seen as key to pursuing the first two, and will mean that China is less than
receptive to outside pressure to adjust its handling of internal dissent. This is a
manifestation of the Chinese saying "nei luan wai huan," which means "disorder within,
danger without."26 While many people may dispute these rather arbitrary labelings of
China's unspoken intent, the similarity is enlightening, and the source of Lieberthal's list
is a key sign of U.S. policy direction. This speech was delivered at the White House as
part of the Clinton Administration's effort to help convince the American people of the




26 Denny Roy, 123.
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY
Returning to the definition of energy security given in Chapter 1— ensuring that a
country has a consistent, uniterruptible supply of energy sufficient to meet its national
objectives for the foreseeable future—one can now apply this to China. This chapter's
focus has been on attempting to assess the last part of that definition—China's national
goals or objectives. The important part for this discussion is the centrality of economic
growth and development in all assessments.
China is determined to prevent returning to a weakened position, and only by
becoming more developed does it see this as unavoidable. This will lead to a tenacity and
determination in pursuit of growth that is reminiscent of Meiji Japan.27 China's leaders
will go to great lengths to continue on their current path. Not only China's greatness but
their regime's security is at stake. A challenge with this course is going to be
guaranteeing sufficient energy sources to meet rapidly growing needs. The desire to
avoid outside influence and ties that could be cut by foreign powers that want to weaken
China, would make a dependence on indigenous energy sources the preferred option.
This, however, is simply not possible, due to a variety of factors that will be examined in
subsequent chapters.
Short of energy autarky, China will be looking beyond its borders for energy in
ever increasing amounts. The security aspect of supplies will loom large in most
27 This is not meant to ascribe any of Japan's past atrocities as being part of any future Chinese plans,
only that there are similarities in the way modern China and Meiji Japan chose to answer outside technical
superiority.
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decisions and lead China to diversify supplies to avoid excess dependence on any one
source. When selecting options, the idea that other sources could be cut by Western
powers who begin to fear China's growth means that the cost of energy sources will be of
secondary importance to their security.
Another aspect of energy choices open to China is the impact of various options
on the environment. There is an increasing awareness of the international implications of
some countries' domestic development policies. The size of China's growing economy
makes this area of grave importance. China's dominant secure energy source is the
country's vast indigenous coal reserves. The importance of security to China means that
as other energy sources begin to appear less secure, coal will play an increasingly
important role. The increased environmental degradation that would likely follow such a
scenario makes this an international concern. This is another reason why China's energy
needs must be acknowledged, and the U.S. and other developed countries must aid China
in finding solutions with minimal negative implications.
As China pursues solutions to her energy needs, the U.S. must view the situation
objectively and not treat every Chinese decision as a threat directed at the United States.
The Chinese are going to be tenacious in pursuit of economic growth and obtaining
energy reserves scattered throughout the globe, including in many countries the U.S.
would like to politically isolate, such as Iran and Iraq. China does not share the U.S.
agenda with these countries, and based on historical experience, has a strong concept of
sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs that cannot accommodate U.S. style
measures against these "rogue" nations. This does not mean that China will intentionally
16
ignore U.S. interests in these areas, only that China will not rule out dealing with these
nations if it fits Chinese needs. The U.S. must be careful as China enters traditionally
U.S. influenced regions in search of energy. If China is made to feel unwelcome, it will
see fears of a Western conspiracy confirmed. This will not cause them to completely turn
inward and ignore the world again. Rather, they will look elsewhere to obtain needed
energy, probably from sources the U.S. does not like, with more determination than
before, and with less concern for U.S. desires, or environmental impact.
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ID. CHINA S ECONOMY AND GROWING ENERGY NEEDS
A. DENG XIAOPING'S REFORMS
By the early 1970's, many Chinese leaders were beginning to see the devastating
toll that radical self-reliance was taking on their economy. It was becoming clear to all
but the most extreme ideologues, that despite China's best efforts, the country was falling
even further behind the rest of the world. Fear of the Soviet Union's military might
enabled those in favor of opening to the outside world to persuade Mao that a
rapprochement with the U.S. would be beneficial. This eventually led to the creation of a
strategic triangle with the U.S., the USSR, and China. This arrangement served all three
countries in a variety of ways, and in China, it appeared to be a resurrection of the age-old
concept of using barbarians to control barbarians. The difference this time around, was
the success of the policy.
Throughout the 1970's, as relations with the U.S. improved, the fear of imminent
invasion from the north lessened, allowing more attention to be focused on economic
concerns. Mao's credibility had been severely weakened by the Cultural Revolution,
which opened the door for a possible departure from some of his policies. After his death
in 1976, there was much debate among potential leaders as to what course to pursue.
Eventually, Deng Xiaoping rose to the top and initiated the "Four Modernizations." The
four areas that were seen in drastic need of development were agriculture, industry,
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national defense, and technology. 28 This led to major changes in economic policy, which
encouraged the formation of rural enterprises and private business, liberalized foreign
trade and investments, relaxed state control over some prices and encouraged increases in
industrial production. 29
B. SUSTAINABDLITY AND THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS
On the whole, these reforms have been spectacularly successful, with overall
growth in China's economy averaging 9.8% a year since 1979, the fastest growth in the
world, and 6.5% faster than the world average.30 This is compared to annual growth in
China of 6% before 1978.31 Also in this period, per capita GDP rose from 397 Yuan to
6,079 Yuan. As the Chinese view it, "over the past 20 years, China's overall national
strength has been...enhanced, people's living standards have been notably improved, and
all social undertakings have been notably advanced."32 Aside from domestic benefits, the
28 See R. Baum (ed.), China's Four Modernisations: the New Technological Revolution (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1980).
29 The "some" is significant, as price controls were not touched in the energy sector, with effects that
will be seen. For a review of specific policy changes, see Barry Naughton, "The Foreign Policy
Implications of China's Economic Development Strategy," in Robinson and Shambaugh, 47-69, specifically
50-51.
™ Chen Xin, "Economic Review: PRC Improves International Standing," (Beijing) Xinhua (1131
GMT, September 30, 1998), FBIS Document ED FTS 199809300000488.
31 Zuliu Hu and Mohsin S. Khan, "Why is China Growing so Fast?," Economic Issues 8, International
Monetary Fund (1997).
32 Xiao Bui, "Reform Improves National Strength, Living Standards," (Beijing) Zhongguo Xinwen
She in Chinese (0927 GMT, September 22, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 19980924000233.
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Chinese also feel that closer links with the global economy have greatly improved the
nation's "international standing."33
China's leaders emphasize the benefits for the whole world of continuing this
growth. President Jiang Zemin believes that "a developed China will represent a
strengthened force for peace" 34 and he is committed to continuing the current growth. In
April of this year, China's Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Jian outlined the lengths to
which his country will go to continue an 8% growth rate into the foreseeable future.
These include offering trade credits and barter terms to ASEAN (the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) countries to bypass their currency exchange difficulties. He
also asserted China's intention to "maintain the exchange rate of the renminbi at any
cost" to ensure China does not catch the current "Asian flu." "China's ambitious plans
seem to reveal a boundless self-confidence" and reflect a determination to continue the
current economic growth.35
But is this growth sustainable? Can China's economy continue to expand at the
current rate? This is a topic of much speculation in recent years. The size of China's
economy makes this is an important question. By 1996, China had the seventh largest
Gross National Product (GNP) in the world at $906 billion (U.S.). In 1997, China ranked
ninth in exports with $182 billion, and eleventh in imports with $142 billion.
33 Chen Xin.
34 From a speech given in Kuala Lumpur in November, 1 994, as quoted in Bill Tarrant, "Developed
China Good for Regional Peace—Jiang," the Reuters Asia-Pacific Business Report (November 1 1, 1994).
35 Global Intelligence Update, Stratfor Systems, Inc. (April 21, 1998), Available [Online]:
http://www.stratfor.com.
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Additionally, China has the world's second largest foreign exchange reserves (behind
Japan), and is the second largest recipient of foreign investment (behind the U.S.).36 At
least until the end of last year, China appeared to be the latest in a long line of Asian
"miracle" economies.
Paul Krugman was one of the first economists to analyze the recent rapid Asian
growth to determine its roots. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1994, he presented his
findings that the Asian growth in all but Japan had been based on largely unsustainable
growth in factor input.37 For this type of growth to continue, there would have to be
corresponding increases in efficiency and productivity of the growing economies.
Eventually, he said, these countries would reach the finite limit of how many resources
they could throw into their economy and still see results as they reached the point of
diminishing returns. This would indicate that the Chinese ambitions are unrealistic and
destined to meet with failure.
However, Krugman admitted that the Chinese economy was difficult to assess due
to its closed nature and different systems of recording progress. A later study by the
International Monetary Fund took Krugman's methodology and conducted further
research in China.38 After finding alternative measures of the economy and
compensating for unknowns, this study found that China was indeed experiencing rapid
and continuous growth in total factor productivity as part of its economic miracle. This
36 Martin Wolf, "Asian Crisis: China's Temptation," The (London) Financial Times (June 30, 1998).
37 Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1994).
3° Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Khan.
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source of growth could be sustained indefinitely, meaning China's leaders are on a viable
path, barring any obstacles.
The most obvious possible obstacle is the recent Asian financial crisis. Will the
effects of this crisis eventually spread to China? So far, the answer seems to be no.
China appears to have successfully avoided the rising tide, and when most Asian
economies crashed in late 1997, the Chinese economy continued on its previous course,
registering 8.8% growth for the year. 39 It has, however, felt the effects of its neighbors'
devastated economies in the form of drastically decreased demand for Chinese products
in Asia. This drop has slowed China's planned growth to a 7% annual rate for the first
half of 1998. While this is still quite respectable growth, especially when most Asian
countries are experiencing negative growth, it is short of the 8% goal that Chinese leaders
have presented as the minimum necessary to help avoid massive increases in
unemployment.40 Add to this the possible impact recent massive flooding in China could
have on domestic demand, and the 8% goal seems unrealistic, despite all of the invested
rhetoric.
Further, China's economy does have some structural problems that are quite
similar to those of the collapsed Asian economies. In his new book China's Unfinished
Economic Revolution, Nicholas Lardy points out three specific problems in China that are
not viable over the long term. "First, state-owned enterprises are becoming ever more
39
"China's Economy Presses Ahead in 1997," Asia Pulse (December 31, 1997). This and all
subsequent Asia Pulse articles are available [Online]: http://www.asiapulse.com.
4
"China: Slowing Economy," 'In Perspective '-The Oxford Analytica Weekly Column (July 8, 1998).
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indebted, particularly to banks.... Second, state-owned banks and other financial
institutions are extending loans at what appears to be a pace that will not be economically
sustainable," and "third, government revenues declined by two-thirds relative to output
between 1978 and 1995."41 The over-extension of credit and resulting high percentage of
nonperforming loans in Chinese banks is pointed out by numerous analysts.42 This is
also recognized by China's leaders as a problem that must be corrected, as evidenced by a
recent discussion in the Chinese media.43
A further burden that China must address is the problem of reforming state owned
enterprises (SOE's) without completely overloading the country's ability to absorb
workers. One of the largest problems in this process will be the creation of some sort of
social safety net to replace the welfare function of the SOE's. This challenge is explored
by Neil Hughes in "Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl."44
Despite these difficulties, China is not necessarily heading for financial collapse.
Most of the analysts cited above see this as unlikely. The largest cushion between China
and a financial collapse is the nonconvertability of the Yuan for capital account
41 Nicholas Lardy, China's Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute
Press, 1998), 4-5.
42 For some examples, see Gerald Segal, "Economic Crisis in China as Reform Effort Stalls,"
International Herald Tribune (Paris, September 28, 1998); Martin Wolf, "Asian Crisis: China's
Temptation"; Nicholas Lardy, "China and the Asian Contagion," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 1998):
78-88; James Harding and James Kynge, "Zhu Rongji: Deng's No-Nonsense Disciple," The (London)
Financial Times, (March 18, 1998).
43 Liu Shiba, "Preventing Financial Crisis and Revitalizing East Asian Economy," (Beijing)
Guangming Ribao in Chinese (September 11, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 19980924001655.
44 Neil C. Hughes, "Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 1998): 67-77.
24
transactions. While many western nations see this as a barrier to business in China, it has
served as a shock absorber in the recent crisis and prevented speculators from
undermining China's currency. Additionally, unlike many other Asian countries, China
has a long term trade surplus and is not dependent on foreign capital inflows to finance a
trade deficit.45
While these attributes of China's economy may help inoculate it against the
current "Asian flu," Beijing still needs to address the problems mentioned above.
Especially if China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO) and further opens its
markets, the country may not be able to continue sheltering state-owned enterprises and
banks. Lardy's Unfinished Revolution provides a detailed accounting of steps that can be
taken to improve Chinas long-term financial stability. Like most analysts, Lardy is
optimistic that China's economy is essentially sound and will continue to grow into the
next century.
C. AGGREGATE ENERGY DEMAND AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE
FUTURE
As China continues growing, a major challenge for Beijing will be obtaining
sufficient energy to fuel the rapidly expanding economy. These energy needs are
substantial today, and will be more so over time. The determination that China's leaders
are likely to show towards enabling growth means that they will go to great lengths to
45 While parts of these explanations can be found in many of the articles cited above, a succinct listing
can be found in Nicholas Lardy, "China and the Asian Contagion."
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ensure that the development drive doesn't stall due to energy shortages. As a recent
Guoji Shangbao article summarized the situation, China's "energy development strategy
is an important constituent element of the national economic development strategy," and
"guaranteeing a supply of energy is the core issue of the energy development strategy."46
An examination of China's current energy needs, as well as projected supply and demand,
will highlight the scope of the challenge facing Beijing.
In 1995, China's total primary energy consumption was approximately 36
quadrillion Btu. This was the second highest in the world behind the U.S. at 88
quadrillion Btu.47 China was self sufficient in energy until the 1990's when the situation
began to change. In 1993, the country became a net importer of petroleum due to a
reliance on imports for a variety of refined products. In 1995, China became a net
importer of crude oil and overall energy. This is due primarily to the rapid economic
growth of the country. Indigenous energy supplies have continued to grow, but are no
longer able to keep pace with demand. The specific situation for each source of energy
will be examined in subsequent chapters. At this point, aggregates will be sufficient to
highlight energy trends.
46
"Key Issues of Energy Development Strategy," (Beijing) Guoji Shangbao in Chinese (July 14,
1998): 6, FBIS Document ID FTS 19980925001692.
47 For consistency, except where noted, all statistics concerning energy in China will come from U.S.
Department of Energy sources, principally the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Most statistics
used are available on line at http://www.eia.doe.gov. A variety of units will be used as different energy
sources use different scales. Conversion factors are provided in the Logan et al, A-13, and at the JEA web
page, http://www.iea.org/stats/files/coneniitm.
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Forecasting future energy import demand will be the key to determining if China's
pursuit of energy security is a threat to U.S. interests. This task comprises two separate
requirements. The first is projecting the future growth of China's economy and
examining any likely structural changes to determine future energy demand. That will be
the focus of the remainder of this chapter. The second part of the puzzle will be an
examination of China's indigenous energy sources and a review of options for the future
to determine how much of the demand can only be met through imports. That will be
done in subsequent chapters. Following that, a review of current and future import
options available to China will determine whether China's needs can be met without
conflict.
As discussed earlier, it appears that China's economy is essentially sound and will
likely continue growing. The challenge now becomes determining the extent of future
growth. There have been numerous attempts to do this over the last twenty years, and
most have woefully underestimated the potential of China's economy.48 A partial
explanation for this is that China is managing to increase efficiency as it develops.49 This
has made predictions difficult, as China keeps "squeezing" more and more output from
4° One of the biggest challenges in predicting China's economic future has been the difficulty of
obtaining accurate and predictable data. This affected the ability of Krugman's study to fully assess China.
As the IMF study described the situation, "this difficulty in obtaining meaningful data means that "figures
for Chinese economic growth... vary depending on how an analyst decides to account for them." Zuliu Hu
and Mohsin Khan, 2. For more on this challenge, see Lardy, China 's Unfinished Economic Revolution, 9-
10.
49 This will be explored in more depth in Chapter IV. This chapter will simply rely on predictions of
China's growth that have been reasonably accurate.
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every unit of input. The result is growth that keeps exceeding predictions and energy
demand that is growing, but slower than GDP.
Of the numerous efforts to predict China's growth in the last decade, one of the
most successful was done by RAND. In MAGIC: Models of Aggregate Growth in
China,50 Donald Henry constructed three different models to make predictions about
China's economy, and considered a wide range of variables to try and account for every
conceivable growth strategy open to China. The scenario that has proven the most
accurate thus far, was a "high productivity, high savings" combination run through the
civil-military interactions model. This model is a good choice as it incorporates the
military sector, unlike many other models. The PLA in China plays a large role in the
economy, and excluding its effects would capture only an incomplete picture of the
economy.
The result of this scenario predicts an annual GDP growth rate of slightly more
than 7% through 2010. Based on recent performance, this prediction seems possible.
The more conservative estimates in the RAND study expect growth in the 5-6% range.
For the purposes of computing energy demand in this thesis, the lower estimate of 5%
will be used as a low growth scenario, and 10% (the recent average of 9.8% rounded up)
will be used for the high growth scenario.
Based on China's displayed energy usage patterns, demand for energy should be
expected to grow at a rate slightly less than these two figures. Some predictions of likely
50 Donald Putnam Henry, MAGIC: Models of Aggregate Growth in China (Santa Monica: RAND,
1991).
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energy growth can be found in Table 1 . This table gives a picture of predicted growth in
China's energy demand from 3 different sources. The World Bank projects
approximately 6.5% annual growth through 2005 with no projections beyond that. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) projects 4.4% annual growth through 2010. The U.S.
Department of Energy's (DOE) internal study provides two estimates.51 The first is the
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario that applies projected economic growth to current
energy supply patterns, anticipating no major structural changes in the industry. This
scenario predicts an increasing rate of growth from 5.3% through 2000, rising to 6.6% for
201 1-2015. As an alternative view, the energy efficient (EE) scenario assumes that China
takes the type of conservation actions stated in the ninth five-year plan, and takes
advantage of some existing technology to reduce wastage. This scenario still predicts
increasing growth, though less than the BAU scenario. These projections are for 5.1%
growth through 2000, and 5.8% for 2011-2015. A more recent study done by the EIA
predicts 5.4% energy growth through 2020.52
51 This study was conducted jointly by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which completed
information for China's energy supplies, and the Pacific National Laboratory, which completed all
information on energy demands. It was published as E. Ian McCreary et al, "China's Energy: A Forecast to
2015," U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Intelligence, publication LA-UR-96-2972 (September
1996): III-4.
52 International Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections through 2020, U.S. Energy Information
Agency (April 20, 1998), Available [Online]: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo98/home.html.
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Years 1994-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 Demand in 2005
World Bank 6.5 6.5 N/A N/A 1,267 Mtoe53
IEA 4.4 4.4 4.4 N/A 987 Mtoe
BAU 5.3 6.0 6.4 6.6 1,136 Mtoe
EE 5.1 5.6 5.7 5.8 1,103 Mtoe
Table 1 . Projected Energy Demand Percentage Growth Rates54
For computations in this thesis, the low growth scenario will use 4% growth in
energy demand (the TEA prediction rounded down) and the high growth scenario will use
8% (a figure less than expected economic growth, yet higher than any of the estimates in
the table. This will provide two extreme values to determine likely possibilities. Further,
this thesis will follow a business as usual approach similar to the DOE's. In this thesis,
this means that the basic distribution of China's energy usage among different fuels will
remain essentially static. Using the two scenarios of high and low growth allows for
energy efficiency measures to be implemented without dramatically altering either
extreme. Any changes in this area would simply slide the total demand more towards the
low growth extreme. One difference in these scenarios that will have implications for
security is the possibility that the percentage each type of fuel occupies in current usage
might change. One likely version of this possibility will be discussed later in this chapter.
While this could have significant impact on the scope of demand for some fuels, by
53 Mtoe is Million tons of oil equivalent. The abbreviations toe and tee (tons of coal equivalent) are
frequently used as a standard comparison of energy levels.
54 Adapted from McCreary et al.
30
examining the high and low growth scenarios to see if the pursuit of needed energy could
lead to conflict, it will then be easy to explore variations in closing chapters.
D. CURRENT ENERGY USAGE
China's Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) in 1996 was 1097 Mtoe. Total
Commercial Energy Consumption (TCEC) was 838.9 Mtoe, and came from the various
fuels as indicated in Figure l.55 Of this total, 325 Mtoe, or 38.7%, went to electricity
generation. The remainder was distributed among the various end-use sectors as shown
in Figure 2., all of which are continuing to grow as part of ongoing development plans.
McCreary et al predicts that the overall distribution will change only slightly, with
industry's share decreasing. The electricity sector is very important to China's
development plans as this provides energy for many other enterprises. Additionally,
increasing electrification is a key social goal as approximately 100 million people live
without electricity.56 Further, due to the variety of options available in this sector, later
55 The TPES figure is from the International Energy Agency (EEA), "Key Energy Statistics for China,"
Available from the IEA web page [Online]: http://www.iea.org/stats/files/selstats/keyindic/nmc/ china.html.
The breakdown by fuel is created from data in Jeffrey Logan et al, China 's Electric Power Options: An
Analysis of Economic and Environmental Costs, Advanced International Studies Unit, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory Report Number PNWD-2433 (June 1998). Available [Online]: http://www.pnl.gov/
China/chinapwr.pdf, 1. TCEC reflects only commercial energy supply, while the TPES inculdes rural
supplies of noncommercial sources, such as small applications of wind and solar power, and the extensive
use of biomass. The total measure of these types of sources amounts to over one quarter of the TPES.
These sources are not applicable to the commercial energy market, and are limited to specific applications
that will be discussed in Chapter VI. Most comparisons in this thesis will use TCEC.
56 Estimates of this number vary widely from a low of 70 million in Buczek, "Fueling China's
Growth," to a high of 200 million in Elizabeth Economy, "The Environment and Development in die Asia
Pacific-Region," in Fires Across the Waters: Transnational Problems in Asia, ed. James Shinn (New York:
Brookings Institute Press, 1998), 49. The official Chinese estimate is 72 million. 100 million is a
reasonable middle ground that is chosen by numerous other sources, including International Energy
Outlook 1998.
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chapters, which examine various energy options, will focus primarily on applications that
are applicable to the electricity sector.57
In 1996, China's total electrical generating capacity was 232 GW. In 1995, 76%
of this came from coal fired plants, 19% from hydroelectric power, 4% from oil and gas,
1% from nuclear, and 1% from other renewables. These percentages are expected to
evolve slightly as China attempts to raise capacity. Demand for electricity in the 1990's
has outstripped overall energy growth and GDP growth by increasing at a 10% annual
rate.58 This increase is due to a number of factors, including an increase in electric
machinery in agriculture and manufacturing, the evolving importance of high electricity
intensity industries such as petrochemicals and construction materials, and an increasing
standard of living that is demanding more residential electricity.
57 The single largest energy using sector in China is actually the industrial sector, but this is a very
diverse grouping of many types of enterprises. Exploring all of the options available for meeting energy
needs in every possible manufacturing arena would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The electrical sector
is the largest user of energy that represents a relatively homogeneous grouping, where the end product is
indistinguishable among suppliers. Therefore, various options for filling needs are essentially
interchangeable, which makes for good comparisons. This will permit a relatively thorough review of the
options open to a single large user of China's energy.
58 Logan et al, 26.
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China's Total Commercial
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Figure 2. Sectoral Distribution of Energy Use in China
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The Advanced International Studies Unit (AISU) of the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory predicts that these factors will be somewhat mitigated in coming
years by the development of advanced technologies, which will reduce electricity
intensity in many industries. As a result, AISU predicts annual electricity demand will
grow, but at a decreasing rate, starting at 6.8% for 1996-2000, declining to 4.5% by 2016-
2020. This is comfortably between the high and low growth extremes, therefore, those
numbers—though derived from total energy demand—will be applied to electricity
demand to evaluate various options.
Table 2. applies the low and high growth rates to the 1996 electrical generating
capacity of 232 GW and derives capacity for each year through 2010 that will be needed
to meet demand.















Table 2. Required Growth in Electricity Generation Capacity (GW)
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The ninth five-year plan sets ambitious goals of 300,000 MW by 2000, and 540,000 by
20 10.59 These goals, if met, will exceed the low growth requirements for 2000 by 29 GW
or 10.5%, and the requirements for 2010 by 138 GW or 34%. However, This rate of
development would fall short of needed capacity under the high growth scenario by 16
GW or 5% in 2000, and by 141 GW or 21%. Hydropower, nuclear, and natural gas will
likely increase their shares slightly, but coal will remain dominant. The specific role of
each of these will be discussed in subsequent chapters, as well as the potential of each to
absorb more capacity if the high growth scenario occurs. In those discussions, the impact
of growing demand will be assessed with reference to indigenous production capabilities
to determine import requirements.
E. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF OIL
As mentioned, the business as usual approach assumes that the distribution of the
various components of China's TCEC will change little in the coming years. This allows
for simple calculations and predictions. Further, this is the approach taken by most
analysts, therefore, it is a sensible starting point. However, this distribution is not
necessarily going to stay the same. One of the most likely modifications is the possibility
of oil taking on a more important role.
This would simply mean that as China develops, its energy picture will come to
look more like most other developed countries. Many sectors in China have artificially
59 These numbers are compared to current U.S. capacity of 706,000 MW. (a Megawatt is a measure of
instantaneous capacity and does not reflect actual usage) Buczek, 8.
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low oil consumption today due to a shortage of supply either resulting from either
government rationing or transportation inadequacies. According to the IEA, "there will
undoubtedly be an increase in residential and transport sector energy demand when
supply problems are alleviated and energy becomes available."60 Increases in oil and gas
usage are likely to result as China's transportation sector grows rapidly, trains are
upgraded to new diesel engines, China's consumers get used to automobiles, and the
residential sector gains increased access to modern heating and cooking sources.
Some indications of this trend can already be seen. One example is the growth of
China's automotive industry, which produced 13.2 million motor vehicles in 1996,
compared to a mere 560,000 in 1988. 61 The total number of motor vehicles registered in
China in 1995 rose to 10.4 million, from only 1.2 million in 1975.62 Of this number, over
60% is due to commercial trucks and buses, over twice the percentage in the United
States. As private cars—and the fuel to run them—become more available in China, it is
likely that the number of cars will raise dramatically, further increasing oil demand. In
the residential sector, over 80% of today's rural energy needs in China are filled by
noncommercial fuel sources like biomass. This is not factored into the above totals. As
60 The World Energy Outlook 1994, IEA, Executive Summary, 4, Available [Online]:
http://www.iea.org/iea/goals/flles/eadweo94Jitm.
61 William Spodak, "Power Struggle," The China Business Review 25, no. 2 (March 1998): 25.
62 This is a combined total of automobile registrations, which were 4.179 million and .351 million in
1995 and 1975 respectively, and truck and bus registrations of 6.221 million and .811 million in the same
years. Stacy C. Davis et al, Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 17, Center for Transportation
Analysis, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Publication ORNL-6919 (June 1998), Available [Online]:
http://www-cta.ornl.gov/data/tedbl7/tedbl7.html, 1-2, 1-3.
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the society develops further, more of the rural areas could switch to conventional sources,
further increasing the importance of oil and gas in China's future.
All of these increases in demand would mean that while oil and gas may likely
increase their share of the TCEC, their relative contributions to electrification will likely
fall. The limited supplies of these fuels available will make them too valuable to use in
areas where other fuels can meet needs. For electrification, this means that whatever
demand cannot be met by hydropower, nuclear, and commercial renewables, will likely
be absorbed by coal. Therefore, the increasing importance of oil and gas in China will
also lead indirectly to greater usage of coal, with all of its environmental implications.
The EIA's conclusions in McCreary et al suggest that, while China will turn to the
world market for increasing amounts of oil, the quantities demanded will not likely
impact the world price structure. If these quantities dramatically increase, this could
change. China's demand, coupled with any resurgence of 1970's style oil supplier
cooperation in raising prices could have a huge impact on U.S. energy security. While
this is not necessarily going to occur, it is a scenario that needs further exploration. The
significance that an increased dependence on oil could have on world supplies will be
examined after the role of oil is reviewed. For now, it is beneficial to just recognize that
this is one possibility that could change many predictions, as oil is the most politically
important energy source to most countries.
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IV. CHINA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. THE ENVIRONMENT-SECURITY LINKAGE
The quote by Robert Priddle, Executive Director of the IEA, in the introduction
(page 3) highlights the important role that environmental impact is beginning to assume
in world energy policies. This theme is increasingly being heard from groups like the
IEA— an organization created to help guarantee the security of the industrialized world's
oil supplies. Priddle said in a different speech that "environment questions are now one
of the driving forces of energy policy."63 He went on to state that "ensuring that energy
exploitation and use is environmentally acceptable is, indeed, now an important aspect of
long-term security of supply."64
This increasing connection between security and the environment is reflected in
the U.S. National Security Strategy, which states "decisions today regarding the
environment and natural resources can affect our security for generations."65 Man's most
pronounced impact on the environment comes through energy usage, with the energy
sector accounting for approximately three-quarters of the world's carbon dioxide (CO2)
63 Robert Priddle, "Changes in World Energy," Fourth TERI Foundation Day Lecture, New Delhi
(December 3, 1996): 5, Available [Online]: http://www.iea.org/new/speeches/priddle/1997/pindia2.htm.
[October 10, 1998]
64 Ibid, 6.
65 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October,
1998)
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emissions, one-fifth of its methane, and a "significant quantity" of nitrous oxide.66 From
this perspective, it is clear that choices a country makes in its pursuit of energy security
can have impacts beyond its borders. The Clinton Administration's view is that
"environmental threats do not heed national borders and can pose long-term dangers to
[U.S.] security and well-being."67
Specifically pertinent to this analysis, China's future energy choices are of great
concern to that country's neighbors and to the United States. China has a significant
challenge ahead in meeting its growing energy needs. The scope of likely future Chinese
energy usage makes Beijing's energy choices security issues for the entire world.
Therefore, this chapter will review the environmental impact of various energy options
and possible ways of mitigating that damage. When subsequent chapters examine the
specifics of each energy source in China, the environmental aspects of each can be kept in
mind to fully assess the implications of any choices the Chinese make.
B. ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Environmental pollutants can be classified by a number of means. First, there are
two general categories: man-made, and naturally occurring materials. The first of these
refers to materials that "are not part of natural environmental cycles and therefore do not
66
"Global Climate Change-Science and Solutions: What is the Energy Sector's Role?," A Fossil
Energy Issue Review, U.S. Department of Energy, Available [Online]: http://www.fe.doe.gov/issues/
globalclimate_energyJitml. [October 2, 1998]
67 A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, 13.
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readily break down when released into the environment."68 The latter of the two
concerns naturally occurring materials, but ones "that appear in much higher
concentrations than would normally be the case."69 These are not inherently harmful, but
can be when natural cycles are overloaded. The energy sector emits byproducts in both of
these categories. The effects of those products can be grouped into three areas of
concern. These are air pollution, water pollution, and toxic hazardous waste disposal.70
The most pronounced effects, and those that will receive the most attention here, are
energy's contributions to air pollution. This is because nearly 90% of the world's energy
comes from fossil fuels, and the most serious polluting effect of fossil fuels is the release
of various compounds into the air that occurs when they are burned.71
1. Air Pollutants from Fossil Fuels
Those compounds released in the burning of fossil fuels are essentially naturally
occurring materials, but as mentioned above, they are in vast quantities and are released at
such a rapid rate that the ecosystem cannot absorb them. The primary pollutants released
are nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide
(CO2), and ozone.72 Most of these are not inherently harmful, but can be at certain levels.
68 Chris C. Park, Acid Rain: Rhetoric and Reality (NY: RouUedge, 1 990), 2.
69 Ibid.
70 Paul In-Fei Liu, Introduction to Energy and the Environment (NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993),
1.
71 Energy Usage Statistic is from International Energy Outlook 1998.
72 Liu, 8.
41
CO2 is a naturally occurring byproduct of many processes including breathing, and is
essential for plants to use to produce oxygen. However, energy use has raised the levels
in the atmosphere well above the ability of the environment to absorb it, and the
remainder collects in the atmosphere along with other byproducts of fossil fuel use
—
principally methane and nitrous oxide—as "greenhouse gases" (GHG). Also released
during the combustion of fossil fuels are various amounts of particulate matters, such as
coal ash. These impact the environment around their source, and pose a health risk to
humans who inhale them.
2. Other Effects of Fossil Fuels
Though this thesis will focus on air pollution, the world's (and particularly
China's) extensive use of fossil fuels poses other risks to the environment, by affecting
water and land as well. The risks to water include dumping of solid wastes or waste-
water from power plants or seepage of acid runoff from mines into rivers and streams,
and risks of spills and leaks from petroleum extraction, processing, and shipping
operations. In China today, seven major river systems are considered severely polluted.73
Even if none of these potential problems occurred, many uses of fossil fuels—especially
power generation—require vast quantities of water during routine functioning. In China,
many fuel sources are located in arid regions, so that when power plants are built at mine
sites to minimize transportation, they may impact the available water in those regions. 74
73 Logan et al, 14.
74 For a discussion of these issues in China, see Vaclav Smil, China's Environmental Crisis: An
Inquiry Into the Limits ofNational Development (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 115-1 16.
42
The largest impacts of fossil fuels on the land occur in the loss of arable farmland
and deforestation.75 The first of these is particularly significant in China with its vast
population to feed. Coal is the biggest offender in this category, contributing to land loss
all the way through its usage cycle. Coal mines cause obvious damage to the land,
especially surface mines. In China, even underground mines can have a huge impact, as
the roofs are frequently caved in to extract ore. Vaclav Smil estimates that mines claim
land at the rate of 5,000 ha per year.76
The construction of power plants—not just coal-fired—claims even more land.
Smil estimates that between 1957 and 1990, this claimed over 60,000 ha. After coal is
burned, huge amounts of ash are generated which is then dumped, claiming more land, at
the rate of 6,000 ha per year. These and other factors have contributed to the loss of
arable farmland in China at the rate of over 1 million ha (Mha) per year from 1957 to
1990. This rate has decreased somewhat in the 1990's but China had only 95.72 Mha of
arable farmland in 1988, and must feed a growing population.77
Deforestation is also a significant problem in China. Caused largely by sulfur
emissions, the rapid loss of forests has accelerated desertification. Its effects are quite
75 Many of the other effects that energy usage has on land are byproducts of waste dumping. This is
generally seen as contamination of ground water or streams due to hazardous materials leaching though soil
or reaching streams through runoff. For a review of U.S. efforts to control these problems, see U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Industrial Solid Wastes From Manufacturing,
Mining, Oil and Gas Production, and Utility Coal Combustion, Background Paper OTA-BP-0-82
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992), Available [Online]:
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/pubs_n.html.
76 A ha is a hectare, or 2.47 acres. Estimate in Smil, 1 12-1 13.
77 Ibid, 141.
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obvious in southwestern China. One of the more pronounced examples is Sichuan
Province. This once lush area now has less than 12% forest cover. 78
3. Acid Rain
Acid rain is one of the most damaging and widespread effects of fossil fuel
pollution. The primary acid gases emitted in energy usage are oxides of sulfur (SOx) and
nitrogen (NOx). These gases are formed when elemental sulfur and nitrogen in fossil fuels
combines with oxygen. The emitted gases react with hydroxyl radicals in the atmosphere
to form sulfuric and nitric acid, then they combine with water vapor and fall to the earth
as "acid" rain or snow.79 They can also attach to other particles in the air and fall to earth
as "dry deposition," which becomes acidic when it comes into contact with water. This
tends to be a relatively localized phenomenon, generally landing between 5 and 25 km
from the source. In contrast, acid rain can occur thousands of kilometers from the source,
constituting an "invisible export."80
Dry deposition generally has the most noticeable effects by causing damage to
humans, vegetation, and buildings. In China, these effects are taking their toll through
health problems, damage to historic structures, and by threatening the future viability of
78 Logan et al, 14.
79 See Lyuba Zarsky, "Energy and the Environment in Asia Pacific: Regional Cooperation and Market
Governance," Draft Paper Presented at the Symposium on the United Nations in the 21 st Century, United
Nations University, New York (November 14-15, 1997), Available from the Nautilus Institute Web Page at:
http://www.naudlus.org/aprenet/library/regional/Zarsky_energy-envir.html [November 17, 1998].
80 Park, 3.
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prime agricultural land and forests. This is, however, largely confined to Chinese
territory and the problem tends to be internalized by China, and its severity downplayed.
4. Greenhouse Gases
Greenhouse gases (GHG) refer to gases emitted that amplify the atmosphere's
natural greenhouse effect, and thus contribute to global climate change. 81 While the
effects of these gases may be difficult to track, the rising levels of them in the atmosphere
is verifiable.82 The primary GHGs, in order of their contributions, are CO2, methane,
halocarbons, and nitrous oxide.83 CO2 is the largest offender, responsible for an
estimated 64% of GHG input. 86% of the CO2 comes from the burning of fossil fuels
and another 12% from the burning of biomass. Methane is a much more powerful
contributor to the greenhouse effect, but is present in much smaller quantities than CO2.
It still accounts for nearly 20% of the greenhouse effect. It comes from many sources
including the refining of oil, where it is routinely vented or flared in many countries, and
the burning of biomass. Approximately 10% of the effect is attributable to halocarbons or
CFCs, and the remaining 6% is from nitrous oxide.
81 For a review of the greenhouse effect, see Kevin Gurney, "Global Warning and the Greenhouse
Effect," Energy and Security, no. 5, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (March 1998),
Available [Online]: http://www.ieer.org.ensec/no-5/globwarmJitml. [October 10, 1998]
82
It is necessary to acknowledge here that many people remain unconvinced that this phenomenon is
occurring. The level of climate change predicted is extremely difficult to measure, therefore, scientific
certainty is elusive. According to the U.S. DOE, temperatures have risen between 0.5 and 1.1 degrees F
since 1860. See "Global Climate Change: Science and Solutions," A Fossil Energy Issue Review, U.S.




Global warming has received more international attention than other
environmental issues in recent years due to its truly global character. Acid rain and other
damage can be internalized or regionalized, but global wanning is not so easy to isolate.
The nature of this hazard is such that every nation contributes to every other nation's
well-being by its contributions to the global total of GHGs. This has led to attempts to
deal with the issue on a global scale. The most comprehensive attempt so far is the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.84 This
agreement is the subject of much criticism for its failure to include developing
countries—including China. 85 In spite of this shortcoming, Kyoto is an
acknowledgement that a problem does exist, and that it will take an international response
to limit the damage.
C. POLLUTION WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS86
Having seen an overview of air pollution and other effects of fossil fuels use on
the environment, a more in depth look at some of the worst environmental problems
facing China is warranted. This will highlight the importance of considering the
84 The text of the Kyoto Protocol is available [Online]: http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1997/
global.warming/stories/treaty/. [October 2, 1998]
85 For some representative opinions on the Kyoto Protocol, see Patrick J. Michaels, "The
Consequences of Kyoto," Caw Policy Analysis no. 307, Cato Institute, Available [Online]:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pa-307Jitml [October 2, 1998]; Stuart Eizenstat, "Stick With Kyoto: A Sound
Start on Global Warming," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 (May-June 1998): 119-121; and Ronald Bailey, "The
High Cost of Kyoto," ChiefExecutive, no. 135 (June 1998).
86 This was the title of a summary of Chinese pollution by Neil C. Hughes, in "Smashing the Iron Rice
Bowl."
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environment in energy planning, and set the stage for understanding China's energy
picture.
The problems that will be reviewed here are energy sector emissions that
contribute to the greenhouse effect and to acid rain. 87 China has other air pollution
problems, including high particulate and lead emissions, but these are already being
substantially addressed. Particulate emissions in China have been largely stabilized. In
the power sector, particulate emissions in 1987 totaled 3.9 Mtons. By 1994, the annual
total had risen to just 4 Mtons. This is despite an increase in generating capacity of large
power plants from 55 GW to 108 GW. The average particulate removal rate over this
period rose from 92% to 95.6%. 88 China has applied the existing standard technological
solutions to this problem, due to their relatively low cost. Further reductions are unlikely
to be attempted due to "financial constraints and [lack of] enforcement of the existing
emissions standards."89
Lead emissions are a serious health hazard in China. 90% of these come from
automobile exhausts. The rising number of cars in China quickly raised the magnitude of
this problem in recent years. The proven method for combating these emissions is
switching to unleaded gas. Many developing countries resist doing this, due to the
87 For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this thesis, the popularized term "acid rain" will be used
to refer to all effects of acid gases, including both wet and dry deposition.
88 Logan et al, 15
89 Lin Gan, "Energy Development and Environmental Constraints in China," Energy Policy 26, no. 2
(February 1998): 119-128, specifically 123.
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expense involved in converting their cars, refineries, and other assorted parts of the
petroleum supply chain. China has just recently made such a move by announcing that in
1998, eight major cities would switch to unleaded gas and that it would be in use
nationwide by the year 2000.90
Despite all of these measures, China still faces an enormous problem. The
situation is summarized succinctly in Logan et al:
In almost every major city, oxides of sulfur and nitrogen as well as
particulates exceed government standards, often by several hundred
percent. Urban air pollution is responsible for millions of deaths and
injuries each year in China. Acid rain has damaged from 10 to 40 percent
of the land area, and air pollution contributes to over 7 million work-years
lost each year to related sickness. Total GDP loss due to environmental
pollution exceeds 8 percent. 91
1. Acid Rain in China
The primary acid gas that will be dealt with here is Sulfur dioxide. Ninety-four
percent of all sulfur emissions come from the combustion of coal. China's extensive
usage of coal translates directly into heavy sulfur emissions. The largest contribution
comes from coal-fired power plants, while the second largest contributor is industrial
furnaces. Only a handful of China's power plants are equipped with desulfurization
equipment, and almost no industrial facilities are. Only 14 percent of all coal used in
90
"The World Oil Market," in International Energy Outlook 1998, 17-18.
91 Logan et al, 13. The estimate of GDP loss due to pollution is from World Bank, China 2020:
China's Environment in the New Century: Clear Water, Blue Skies (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
1997).
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China is washed, and most of that is coking coal used in the metallurgical industry.92
SO2 emissions have been rising in recent years in direct correlation with the increase in
coal-fired power plants. Total emissions in 1994 were 19 Mtons. This number will likely
climb dramatically as China struggles to meet electrification goals.
Acid rain is a spreading problem in China. Once an urban phenomenon, it has
crept into large rural areas. The hardest hit regions are in south central and southwestern
China. In many areas, 80% of precipitation episodes are acidic (ph below 5.0), with
frequent occurrences under 3.5, and some as low as 2.8. The problem is also migrating,
and is beginning to effect eastern China, and some cities in the north. Direct charges in
four provinces during the late 1980's as a result of acid rain have been estimated at
roughly $2 billion (U.S.). Damage to forests have been estimated to be $125 million
(U.S.) annually.93 Add to this the lost work hours and health problems mentioned above,
and the scope of China's acid rain problem becomes apparent.
The rest of Asia is aware of this problem because they share it. As the National
Security Strategy notes, threats like acid rain do not heed borders. Some of the acid gases
emitted from China's industries blows east and lands in the oceans, or in Korea and Japan.
As shown in Table 3., while the percentage of China's acid deposition that lands in other
92 These statistics are from Jonathan E. Sinton, "China's View of Acid Rain in Northeast Asia and
Regional Cooperation Strategies for Mitigation," Energy Analysis Program, Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, Available from the Center for Global Communications, International University of Japan Web
Page at: http://www.glocom.ac.jp/eco/esena/ resource/sinton/AcidRain.html [November 17, 1998], 4.
Washing of coal is the simplest method of removing some of the sulfur in coal. It is routinely done in most
industrialized countries. The 14% statistic is fromGan, 123.
93 Sinton, 6.
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Asian countries is actually quite small—three percent—it can have a large impact.
China's deposition accounts for 35% of the total in North Korea, and 39% in Vietnam.
These countries, along with Japan and South Korea are experiencing some of the same
effects China is seeing, principally deforestation and reduced crop yields. The acid
deposition that falls in the oceans impacts all of the countries in the region by diminishing
or destroying fish populations.94 These reasons make Chinese emissions a problem for
all of Asia, if not the world.
Country-To-Country Source-Receptor
RECEPTOR % of China's Deposition in Asia % of Receptor's Total Deposition
China 83 98
Oceans 14 37
North Korea 0.8 35
South Korea 0.4 13
Japan 0.5 17
Vietnam 0.4 39
Table 3. Distribution of China's Acid Deposition95
94 For more on the effects of acid deposition in China and its neighbors, see Zarsky, 4-5; Sinton, 4; and
Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky, "Acid Rain in a Regional Context," Paper Presented to Policy Seminar: The
Role of Science and Technology in Promoting Sound Development, Science and Technology Institute, UN
University, Seoul (June 13-15, 1995): \-A, Available from the Nautilus Institute Web Page at: http://
www.nautilus.org/aprenet/library/regional/acidrain.html. [November 17, 1998]
95 From Gregory R. Carmichael and Richard Arndt, "Baseline Assessment of Acid Deposition in
Northeast Asia," ESENA (Energy, Security, and Environment in Northeast Asia), the Nautilus Institute,
Available [Online]: http://www.nautilus.org/esena/papers/carmichaeliitml. [November 17, 1998]
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Formulating a regional approach to this problem has been difficult, due to the
tendency to assess blame for cross-border pollution. China is willing to cooperate in
technical research and development to help mitigate acid gas emissions, but steers clear
of accepting any blame. Further, while there is much talk about combating the problem,
the expense of implementing any large-scale use of desulfurization equipment has meant
that little of the talk has been matched with action.
So long as control of emissions remains expensive, China will
likely maintain that, given its relative poverty, sulfur dioxide emissions
controls can only be phased in slowly, and that absolute levels of acid
precursors emissions will rise. China may be willing to discuss limits to
the rate of growth of total sulfur dioxide emissions, but talks about
reducing total emissions would be unlikely in the near future.96
2. Carbon Emissions in China
China is the world's second largest emitter of carbon, behind the United States. In
1996, China emitted 804 Mtons of carbon, 13% of the world's total. That total was more
than all of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (including Russia) combined.
This is why many analysts are critical of the Kyoto Protocol. Without countries such as
China and India included, meaningful reductions in carbon emissions are unlikely to
occur.
Yet China has a different view on the matter. While acknowledging that carbon
emissions are a significant contributor to global climate change, and that their country is a
major emitter of carbon, China's leaders still claim that their country deserves exemption
96 Sinton, 12.
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from emissions limitations. Instead of discussing absolute levels of emissions, they
prefer to talk about per capita numbers. An example that pertains to carbon emissions
can be found in the 1994 White Paper Agenda 21. That document does not mention
China's total carbon emissions anywhere in the text. Instead it points out that "by the
year 2000, China's per capita emissions of carbon dioxide will still be less than one half
the world's average of 1.2 tonnes per head, or one sixth of the 3.3 tones per head average
of industrialized countries."97 A response to this type of comparison is that regardless of
population size, China is on e of the world's most carbon intensive country, meaning it
emits very high amount of carbon per Btu of energy used.98 Nevertheless, Beijing is
quick to dismiss any environmental criticism from the U.S. who is the world's largest
carbon emitter. However, Agenda 21 is at least an acknowledgement that action must be
taken on this problem, when it states that "China wishes to bring the emissions of
greenhouse gases under control."99
97 Agenda 21: White Paper on China's Population, Environment, and Development in the 21"
Century, Chapter 18, 10. This white paper is available from the official Chinese government Agenda 21
web page [Online]: http://www.acca21.edu.cn/ca21pa.html. [November 17, 1998]
98 Energy Use and Carbon Emissions: Some International Comparisons, U.S. EIA, Office of




D. OPTIONS FOR REDUCING ENERGY SECTOR EMISSIONS 100
This section will explore a variety of general options available to reduce energy
sector emissions, and examine their applicability in China. Most of the discussion will
center on options for reducing acid gases, as this can be addressed throughout the fuel
usage chain, ranging from selection of fuel to the release of emissions. This is because
the amount of acid gases emitted, principally sulfur dioxide, is directly related to the
amount of sulfur in the fuel. Carbon and nitrous oxide emissions, by contrast, are a by-
product of carbon, an integral part of fossil fuels, and nitrogen and oxygen from the
combustion process. Therefore, these can only be addressed at the combustion and
emission phases.
1. Conservation and Efficiency
The obvious place to start in reducing emissions, is to simply reduce energy
consumption. In absolute terms, this is not even a remote possibility in China. The
Country's energy usage will grow, not diminish. The only question is how fast it will
grow. This is where conservation and efficiency can play a role, and to a certain extent,
they are already important to meeting China's energy needs.
One way of measuring the extent of efficiency is using the concept of energy
intensity, which is the ratio of energy use to unit of economic output. 101 As Xiannuan Lin
100 The six general categories that follow are based on divisions in Park, 139-148. Much of the
material in these sections is based on the work, supplemented as indicated.
101 This can be expressed in a variety of ways by using different units. This thesis will express it in the
units used by the EIA, which is thousands of Btu per dollar of GDP.
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discusses in the introduction to China's Energy Strategy, energy use in developing
countries generally follows a pattern of rising energy intensity. 102 This normally reflects
the society's shifting of resources from sectors with relatively low energy usage, like
agriculture, to more energy intensive sectors, like heavy industry. Eventually, as a society
develops further, it transitions from a complete reliance on heavy industry for growth, and
diversifies into lighter industries and services. This normally results in decreasing energy
intensity. China seems to be an anomaly. By most measures, China is still in the early
stages of development, with an emphasis on manufacturing as an engine of growth. Yet
as Figure 3. shows, energy intensity in China has been steadily decreasing since Deng
Xiaoping 's reforms were implemented. Energy intensity today is less than a third of what
it was twenty years ago.
102 Xiannuan Lin, China's Energy Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 1-2. See also Gerald
Leach et al, Energy and Growth: A Comparison of 13 Industrial and Developing Countries (London:
Butterworths, 1986), 27-30; and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Energy in
Developing Countries, OTA-E-486 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991),
Available [Online]: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/pubs_n.html.
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Figure 3. U.S. and China Energy Intensity 103
Explaining this anomaly is the subject of Xiannuan Lin's book. The short answer
is that China truly is becoming more efficient as it develops. This apparent paradox is due
largely to the vast size and diversity of China. There are drastic economic differences
between remote western provinces and advanced coastal regions. The eastern provinces
are indeed well along in the development process, and these economies are moving away
from a dependence on heavy industry. This diversification adds to direct conservation
gains to help reduce China's overall energy intensity.
103 From "China: Energy Situation," U.S. EIA (1997), 7, Available [Online]:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/ emeu/cabs/china/part2.html#ENERGY. [October 10, 1998]
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Yet China's developmental diversity only reveals half of the picture. The other
half provides another indication of Beijing's pragmatism. China's leaders have known
for several years that an energy crunch was coming and have been exploring all options to
avert it. After the oil crises of the 1970's, energy policy began to get more attention
worldwide, not just in China. As will be seen, this led Beijing to focus on coal, as
China's dependable and secure resource. At the same time, however, they began to think
about efficiency. In the Deng era, this thinking gained momentum, and as more
industries began to operate on sound business principles, conservation and efficiency
became a part of doing business. In recent years, it has become a central part of China's
development policy, as indicated through documents like Agenda 21. That document
recognizes that China's industry as a whole is still quite wasteful, and that there is a
future role for efficiency. This passage illustrates the point:
Energy consumption per unit output in China is 3-4 times that in
developed countries. Energy consumption for manufacturing major
industrial products is 40 percent higher than that in foreign countries. The
average energy utilization rate is only around 30 percent, while in
developed countries, it is over 40 percent. Therefore, there is a great
potential for energy conservation in China. 104
Agenda 21 goes on to establish the goal of meeting fifty percent of incremental
energy demands through conservation by the year 2000. 105 While this is probably a bit
ambitious, it emphasizes the awareness among China's leaders that efficiency is
104 Agenda 21, Chapter 13: 7, Section B, para. 25.
105 Ibid, Chapter 13: 7, Section B, para. 29.
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important. The ninth five-year plan reflects this and sets a more achievable goal of
increasing efficiency by five percent annually. 106
2. Fuel Switching
This option reduces emissions by switching energy reliance to lower polluting
fuels, like natural gas. The scope of the growing need in China and, as will later be
demonstrated, the emphasis on security as the number one aspect of energy policy, limit
the role this option can play in China. It is doubtful that this method alone could ever
meet China's demand, let a lone actually reduce emissions. It can, however, contribute to
reducing the growth in emissions if newer power plants and industrial facilities are built
to use cleaner energy sources.
China is pursuing this avenue, to a certain extent. The following chapters will
reveal the true potential of various fuel sources, but the general situation is that while
natural gas will play an increasing role in China, it will remain a relatively insignificant
role for many years. Instead, China will try to use other "clean" sources like nuclear
power and hydroelectric power to help meet growing needs and reduce emissions. The
role of each of these will likely increase in China. Correspondingly, the overall portion of
106 See "China: Energy Situation." For a particularly optimistic view on the role efficiency will play in
meeting China's energy needs, see "Energy Problems in China's Economic and Social Development,"
(Beijing) Jingli Guanli in Chinese, no. 11 (November 1997): 8-9, FBIS Document ID
FTS 19980708000402. This article thinks that conserving energy resources is the "principal solution" to
meeting China's needs, and states that energy conservation alone could support an eight percent growth
rate.
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China's energy needs that is met by coal will decrease slightly, though absolute use will
increase, and it will remain the dominant fuel in China for many years. 107
Aside from completely switching fuels, this option also includes such ideas as
focusing on using coal reserves with a lower sulfur content. China is attempting to do
this, through reform of the coal industry. 108 However, this avenue alone will have limited
success due to a variety of factors that will be analyzed.
3. Fuel Desulfurization 109
This option involves mechanical or chemical processes to reduce the sulfur
content of fuel before it is burned. The most common method is "coal washing." This
process involves grinding coal into small, dust-sized particles that are then floated on
water. Sulfur and other mineral impurities sink, allowing the coal to be separated. It is
then dried in a stream of hot air, usually generated by burning some of the coal, a process
that usually consumes no more than two percent of the coal.
This process removes up to thirty percent of the raw coal as ash, meaning the
remainder is cleaner. This cuts down on the transportation requirement by removing
extraneous weight. The washing normally removes 40-60 percent of the loose sulfur in
the ore, but SO2 emissions are generally reduced by only about 8-15 percent. This
107 See "Coal to Have Less Dominant Role in China, Say Experts," Asia Pulse (August 24, 1998), and
'China's Energy Resources to be Diversified in Next Century," Asia Pulse (August 28, 1998).
108 This will discussed in Chapter V.
109 This process is described in detail in Park, 144-145.
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process cannot remove sulfur that is chemically bonded to the coal. Coal washing is
considered relatively cheap, costing approximately $l-$6 (U.S.) per ton. The process is
also relatively simple, therefore it can be applied in remote areas with limited technical
expertise.
Yet coal washing is not the cure-all for China, as reflected by its minimal usage.
To begin with, the minimal cost can seem excessive when large quantities are involved.
Further, China has never factored environmental impact into cost evaluations, so the coal
industry has been reluctant to increase its usage. Also, coal washing uses a great deal of
water, and produces liquid and solid wastes that have their own disposal problems. Some
of the resultant ash can be used in the cement industry and other enterprises, but most
large-scale coal mines are not geographically situated to take advantage of this option.
Therefore, the waste becomes an added burden with associated costs. The amount of
water used is also a concern in some areas. Many of China's large coal bearing regions
are located in arid zones where water can be a scarce commodity for parts of the year. A
final shortcoming of coal washing is simply that it is not very effective when compared to
other options.
A more effective method of removing sulfur from coal is through chemical
cleaning. This process can remove up to 95% of the inorganic sulfur and half of the
organic sulfur. However, this process is not applicable in China for two reasons. First, it
is much more expensive than washing, adding $20-$30 per ton. With the minimal cost of
washing acting as a disincentive, this process would not even be considered in China.
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The second disadvantage precludes any near-term usage anyway, because this process is
only in the developmental phases, and could not be applied in China for several years,
even if the desire existed.
Another method of removing sulfur from coal is by converting the coal to a gas or
liquid fuel through processes know as gasification of liquefaction. During this
conversion, the sulfur is removed. This method is quite effective, producing a very clean
and efficient fuel. It is also, unfortunately, prohibitively expensive for large-scale use
almost everywhere, and China is no exception.
Sulfur can also be removed from liquid fuels, such as crude oil. This, too is quite
effective, but can add 20-35 percent to the cost of refining the oil. This puts liquid
desulfurization in the same category as coal liquefaction. Both stand little chance of
successful penetration in China.
The result of all of these methods is that the option of fuel desulphurization is
technically possible, but economically questionable as a basis for reducing sulphur
emissions. 110 The only one of these methods that is likely to see any wider usage in
China is coal washing, and its application, and effectiveness, will be limited.
4. Reduction of Pollutants During Combustion
This approach for reducing SO2 emissions involves new types of burners and
boilers to minimize the release of sulfur during the combustion process. The most
common application, though there are many variants, is called fluidized bed technology
110 Park, 145.
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(FBT). 111 This mixes lime with the fuel, which then attaches to the sulfur and falls out as
solid waste, thus preventing it from escaping with the exhaust gases. A specific type of
FBT, called atmosphere fluidized bed combustion (AFBC) is a relatively proven
technology that is in use in some small power plants in China. These systems can reduce
SO2 emissions by 70-90 percent. The units also have reduced NOx emissions because
they operate at a lower temperature than conventional burners. 112 Aside from lower
boiler temperatures, NOx emissions can be reduced by limiting the excess air exposed to
the combustion process. Most of these methods result in NOx emission reductions in the
range of 30-40 percent. 113
All of these systems have some potential in China, but there are numerous
drawbacks as well. To begin with, many of the more effective designs are only in the
demonstration phases, either in the U.S. or Japan. These are years away from commercial
applications in China. Also, these units add to the capital cost of new facilities, though
they cost less than some other options, which will be discussed. Finally, they cannot be
added to existing facilities, meaning they are only an option in future construction.
111 pgj systems are described in Park 145-146.
112 For more on AFBC and some other FBT variants, see David Von Hippel, "Technological
Alternatives to Reduce Acid Gas and Related Emissions from Energy Sector Activities in Northeast Asia,"




5. Reduction of Emissions from the Exhaust Stream
This option is the only effective way of reducing carbon emissions, and one the of
the most common techniques applied to SO2 and NOx emissions. ESENA (Energy,
Security, and Environment in Northeast Asia) calls systems in this category end-of-pipe
solutions. 114 A common name for one type of end-of-pipe system is a scrubber. There
are various types of scrubbers that are designed to remove either SO2 or Carbon.
A standard practice for removing sulfur is called flue gas desulfurization
(FGD). 115 FGD involves passing exhaust gas over or through a substance to remove, or
scrub, the sulfur before releasing the exhaust. The most common substances used are
carbon (dry scrubbers) and lime (wet scrubbers), though other materials are being used in
demonstration and experimentation units. The oldest version is the lime based wet
scrubber that has been in use since 1929. Accordingly, these are the most widely used
FGD systems and the least expensive, although the are still quite costly. This makes them
the most likely to be employed in China.
The newer scrubbers that are being developed offer tremendous advantages over
lime scrubbers, though they will also cost a great deal more. The lime systems produce a
solid waste that must be treated and then deposited in a landfill. The waste from the
newer systems can be processed to provide commercially marketable sulfur and sulfuric
114 These solutions are discussed in Von Hippel, "Technological Alternatives to Reduce Acid Gas and
Related Emissions from Energy Sector Activities in Northeast Asia."
115 See Park, 146-148.
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acid. The sale of these products can help defray the capital outlay for the systems.
However, like many other technological emissions control methods, the current
developmental state of these scrubbers precludes their wide spread use in China.
FGD is the most common end-of-pipe solution, but there are many more in
various stages of development. 116 All sulfur scrubbers are very effective, generally
removing 70-90 percent of sulfur, and most also remove particulates, and some NOx gas,
making them an all around effective emissions reduction tool. Additionally, they can be
retrofit into existing facilities, as well as installed in new plants. Their main limitations
are their high cost, and with those currently available, the extensive generation of solid
wastes.
There are also end-of-pipe systems specifically for treating NOx emissions. One
of the more effective is flue gas recirculation, which diverts the gases back through the
combustion chamber to help reduce the amount of air present. This can result in a 30-40
percent reduction in NOx . Another option is flue gas cleaning, which attempts to remove
NOx from the exhaust stream. This is a difficult process, as NOx is a very stable gas, and
as a result these systems have a low effectiveness, usually around 20%. Since lime
scrubbers also aid in the reduction of NOx emissions, there are new systems being
developed that combine this with a separate NOx removal system to target both SO2 and
NOx . As with many other options, however, these are still in the early developmental
stage, and will undoubtedly be quite expensive.
116 See Von Hippel, "Technological Alternatives to Reduce Acid Gas and Related Emissions from
Energy Sector Activities in Northeast Asia."
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Carbon scrubbers fall into the end-of-pipe category as well. These systems inject
an absorbing metal, alcohol, or some other substance into the exhaust stream at low
pressure and high temperature, which increases CO2 recovery. While these systems are
very effective, they take a toll on a power plant in the form of decreased thermal
efficiency. Reductions from 41 percent to 30 percent are characteristic in a coal-fired
plant. They also have a high cost, usually around $41 per ton of C02 removed. A further
limitation of these systems is that they are difficult to combine with SO2 scrubbers, as the
materials used are adversely affected by SO2. 117
There is a new system being developed that will combine the best of all of these.
This system is a carbon scrubber that uses a variation of flue gas recirculation. The
combined process removes most of the oxygen from the air before SO2 and NOx can
form. As if that were not enough to sell it, this system is expected to cost only $22 per
ton of CO2 removed. Unfortunately, this system is absolute state-of-the-art technology
and is years from commercial deployment.
6. Flue Gas Dispersion
This final alternative was popular for many years, both in China and in the West.
The intent was to disperse the gases enough that the environment could then absorb them.
This led to the "tall stacks policies" seen in Britain and the U.S. in the early 1970's. It
117 For more on the interaction of the various emissions reduction systems, see David Von Hippel,
"Global Dimensions of Energy Growth Projections in Northeast Asia," ESENA, the Nautilus Institute
(November 1996), Available [Online]: http://wvvfw.nautilus.org/esena/papers/dvhglobal.html. [August 31,
1998]
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has since been realized, however, that all this did was to move the problem further from
the source. It did indeed disperse the emissions, but the environment could still not
absorb them. There are still many remnants of this mentality around but fortunately, even
in China, this approach is no longer seen as a valid emission reduction plan.
E. OUTLOOK FOR EMISSION REDUCTION IN CHINA
The general picture painted is that while there are some improvements China can
make to reduce emissions, most technologies that will have any true impact will require at
least outside assistance, if not financing as well. The added expense involved for most
solutions will prevent them from being considered in China. 118 While cost does not seem
to be a major consideration to Beijing when it comes to obtaining and securing energy, it
does seem to play a major role in environmental protection. While Agenda 21 seems to
indicate a determination on the part of China's leaders to protect the environment and
find paths to sustainable development, there is every indication that they lack the capacity
to enforce the new regulations. The largest obstacle is that while decisions are made in
Beijing, they most be implemented by local authorities who stand to lose from any local
economic burden imposed. 119
118 An alternative view is presented in Robert H. Williams, "The Potential for Reducing C02
Emissions With Modern Technology: An Illustrative Scenario for the Power Sector in China," Science and
Global Security 3 (1992): 1-42. Williams presents a fifty-year plan for development of new industries
specializing in environmental protection and renewable energy equipment. He envisions these industries
spurring a technological boom and the new systems actually paying for themselves in energy savings. This
is a remote possibility in any country, and extremely unlikely in China, even in fifty years.
119 See Hughes, "Pollution with Chinese Characteristics."
65
This will mean that efforts to combat SO2 emissions will be more successful than
attempts to control carbon. This same pattern will hold true at the national level as well.
This is because acid deposition is largely a localized phenomenon. Local leaders—and
on a larger scale, national leaders—see the effects of acid deposition in their regions and
on their neighbors. Therefore it is more likely to be seen as a threat. Global climate
change, while potentially catastrophic, is not visible to the average person and it will be
harder to garner support for efforts to combat it in China. 120
120 See Gan, 123.
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V. FOSSIL FUELS IN CHINA
A. COAL
Coal is the most abundant fossil fuel in the world, the largest single source of
fossil fuels in use in the developing world, and it represents approximately 70% of energy
use in China. This is due to a number of factors, the most significant being China's
extensive indigenous reserves. Coal worldwide is heavily concentrated, with China, the
former Soviet Union, and the United States possessing about two-thirds of the world's
total. China ranks third in that list with recoverable reserves conservatively estimated at
114.5 billion tons. 121 In actual annual coal production, China leads the world at 1,116
million tons (Mtons). 122
Aside from the ready supply, coal has many advantages when compared to other
fuel sources:
Per unit of heat value, coal is cheaper than oil and in most cases,
gas. Coal is a familiar fuel with a long established technology. Finally,
coal mine capital costs are low and in many countries [including China]
have a high content of locally manufactured goods and services. 123
121 McCreary et al, II-3, 4. This number is an estimate, as the extent of reserves in China is very
dificult to ascertain due to different accounting systems, and dubious data. For an example of the difficulty
of obtaining a true figure from a government source, see Zhang Zheng, "China's Proven Coal Reserves Not
Very Abundant," (Beijing) Zhongguo Guoqing Guoli , No.7, in Chinese (July 1998): 34, FBIS Document
ID FTS 19980909000395.
122 The U.S. ranks second at 823 Mtons.
123 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Fueling Development: Energy
Technologiesfor Developing Countries, OTA-E-516 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
April, 1992), 231, Available [Online]: http.7/www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/pubs_niitml.
67
These reasons make coal not only affordable and dependable, but—more
importantly to China—secure. The coal industry in China is almost completely self-
sufficient and can provide large amounts of coal at a steady pace, guaranteeing an
uninterruptible energy source. Chinese officials realize that coal is their most secure
resource, and then Premier Li Peng recently outlined China's plan to continue its heavy
use. 124
At first glance, China's increased reliance on coal appears relatively benign. Coal
bearing sediment covers 5% of China's territory and there are deposits in every province.
Approximately 79% of China's reserves are bituminous coal that has a very low sulfur
content (less than 1%) and is in high demand worldwide for high-grade steam and coking
applications. Aside from providing China with a dependable energy source, these
reserves could also bring in outside capital, as their high quality makes them quite
marketable. A further 6% of China's coal is anthracite, or hard coal, which is also
relatively low in sulfur content. Due to this ready supply, coal has fueled the growth of
modern China. Aside from its vast use in electrification, it has been the dominant fuel in
most industrial applications. Until recently, it has powered most of China's trains (many
are still coal-fired), and even through the 1980's and to some extent today, it has played a
major role in household heating and cooking.
Despite this dependence, coal is not the solution to all of China's energy
problems. Aside form the tremendous environmental impact of coal usage, it is also
*24"Li Peng's China Energy Speech", originally published in The People 's Daily (May 30, 1997).
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"difficult to handle and transport, and is less versatile than oil. Its variability and
frequently poor quality discourages the use of advanced combustion technologies and
may contribute to poor power plant performance." 125 This variability in quality is one of
the largest negative factors in China. Despite the country as a whole having a
preponderance of relatively high quality deposits, this "cleaner" coal is concentrated in
massive pockets in just a few areas, principally Inner Mongolia and Shanxi Province.
The coal scattered throughout the rest of the country is of mixed quality at best.
This inequitable distribution is further exacerbated by China's deficient
transportation infrastructure. The vast quantities of coal required in most applications
demands a reliable rail system to transport the needed supplies. China's rail system is
completely inadequate for properly distributing all of these high-grade reserves to the
nation's steel mills and industrial sites where it would be properly used. It is likewise
inadequate for bringing commercially viable quantities of the higher quality ore to
suitable ports for export. 126 The DOE estimates that approximately 20 million tons
(Mtons) of coal per year goes into storage at mine sites due to a lack of transportation.
Also due to inadequate transportation, much coal gets used inappropriately throughout
China. In 1988, only 89 of the 463 million tons of coking coal mined were actually used
for coking. Most of this high-quality coal ends up being burned as regular steam coal or
for household fuel, wasting a valuable export commodity. Further, though coking coal is
125 Fueling Development, 231.
126 The inadequacies of China's transportation infrastructure and efforts to correct them will be
discussed in Chapter VII.
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in demand for specialized use, it actually has a relatively high sulfure content. It use in
regular boilers and stoves, without washing, aggravates China's acid rain problem. 127
The early inability of China's centrally run state coal industry to keep pace with
demand led to the growth of numerous small locally run mines. This allowed local
industries to fill their energy needs on short notice, and it reduced reliance on the central
government. Today, in addition to the 94 key State coal mines, China has 2,500 local
state mines, and 75,000 township and village mines. This dispersion of the industry
helped alleviate some bottlenecks in the system and dramatically boosted output.
As a result of these changes, most of the coal mined in China is in the south due to
abundant, easily accessible reserves in close proximity to China's booming industries.
Unfortunately, most of this coal is of very poor quality, producing minimal energy, and it
often has a very high sulfur content—as high as 20% in some areas. Extensive reliance
on these reserves has increased pressure on China to find alternative energy sources or
methods of mitigating the environmental impact of coal. The concern with this increased
usage of high-sulfur coal can be summarized as merely converting "energy security into
environmental security, for the Chinese themselves; for countries adjacent to China, such
as Japan with its acid rain-diminished forests; and for the world at large, fated to suffer
significant increases in greenhouse gas emissions." 128 This makes it in the best interests
of the United States and the rest of the industrialized world to encourage China to shift to
127 Sinton.
128 Yergin, Eklof, and Edwards, 37.
70
other resources or help provide "clean coal" technology. Unfortunately, there is no easy
solution. While China has shown signs of increased environmental awareness in the ninth
five-year plan, it may be difficult to convince Beijing to rely less on coal when China
produces fewer green house emissions than the U.S., Western Europe, or the former
Soviet Union.
Short of actually switching to another fuel, China has attempted to shift reliance
back to cleaner coal sources. While it struggles to increase the transportation capabilities,
Beijing has taken steps to reform the coal industry. The massive increase in the number
of mines that occurred during the 1980's has led to massive overcapacity in the 1990's.
The government estimates that current nationwide stockpiles of coal reached 65.68 Mtons
at the end of June 1998. 129
To reduce these stockpiles and enforce new safety and environmental rules,
Beijing plans to close 22,000 small mines that are operating without licenses. This action
is expected to reduce total output by 200 Mtons. Control of the 94 state owned mines is
being transferred to the provincial governments to allow them to better balance supply
and demand within their regions. 130 To allow for future increases in production with
expected growth in demand, the central government plans to develop 16 larger,
129 Zhao Shaoqin, "Mine Closure Scheme to Overcome Coal Glut," (Beijing) China Daily, Business
Weekly Supplement, Hong Kong Edition (23-29 August, 1998): 1, FBIS Document ID
FTS 19980824000448.
130 Ibid. See also Peng Jialing, "What Should I Manage If I Am Not Managing Enterprises-State Coal
Industry Bureau Director Zhang Baoming Discusses Major Changes in Management Functions," (Beijing)
RenminRibao in Chinese (September 18, 1998): 2, FBIS Document ID FTS 19980922000445.
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automated coal mines located near new power plants. This mine-mouth co-location is to
reduce transportation requirements. 131
While China will see a short term drop in coal production due to this
reorganization, coal production will remain capable of absorbing any demand not met by
other sources of energy. The percentage of coal usage in China's electricity future
—
unlike other fuels that will be examined—will not be determined by supply capabilities.
Instead, coal will account for whatever portion of future demand that is not switched to
rely on other sources. In the subsequent examinations of other fuels, projections will be
made for what role each fuel is likely to play in the future. Coal will essentially be
whatever is left. This amount will be reviewed in the closing chapters.
B. OIL
Oil plays a central role in the energy picture of most countries, providing 40% of
the world's commercial energy. 132 Twenty-five years ago, the same was true in China,
but today it is less important. In 1957, sixty percent of the oil used in China was
imported. The fear of dependence drove China to aggressively pursue indigenous oil
development. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, China's oil industry experienced 25%
annual growth, which allowed it to not only met China's needs, but allowed the country
131
"China to Implement New Coal Development Strategy," (Beijing) Xinhua (0908 GMT, September
30, 1998) FBIS Document ID FTS 19980930000326.
132 World Resources Institute (WRI), World Resources 1996-1997: A Guide to the Global
Environment, WRI Web page, Chapter 12, Available [Online]: http://www.wri.org/wr-96-97/96tocfulJitml.
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to become an oil exporter. This secure position led to a feeling of confidence in oil,
which resulted in China building some power plants and industrial enterprises powered
by oil.
By the 1980's, demand was soaring and domestic production could not keep pace.
In 1993, China became a net importer of petroleum products, and by 1996 the country
was a net importer of crude oil, despite being the world's fifth leading oil producer.
Beijing began to refocus on energy security as an enabler of growth and started shifting
from reliance on oil back towards coal and other fuels. 133 As a result, today, oil's role in
China's electrical and industrial sectors is minor. While it is the major fuel in the
transportation sector, that sector represents only 10% of China's TPES. 134 Overall, oil
represented only 15.8% of commercial energy consumption in China in 1996. 135
From this perspective, oil would appear to be an unusual place for concern about
conflict with China. Yet, this is where U.S. and Chinese interests are most likely to
contradict. This is due to three main factors. The first is the fact that—as discussed
earlier—oil is likely to assume an increasingly important role in China as development
continues. The second factor is that due to the size of China's economy, even though oil
may represent a small percentage of the country's energy usage, this is still a very large
amount. As China continues to grow, this will become even more significant. The third
133 McCreary et al, H-7-II-ll. This section provides most of the background on the evolution of
China's oil industry.
134 Ibid, III-5.
135 IEA, "Key Energy Statistics for China."
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important factor is that despite China's aggressive attempts to expand domestic oil
production, the gap between demand and indigenous supply continues to widen, leading
China to look beyond its borders for a greater amount of oil each year. The paths Beijing
is choosing to find this oil and implications for U.S. policy will be discussed later in this
chapter. First, an examination of China's domestic oil production will help clarify the
scope of China's import needs.
China's oldest and largest oil field is the Daqing field in the Songliao Basin in
Heilongjiang Province. Daqing began production in 1959, and produced nearly a quarter
of China's oil from 1968-1976. Unfortunately though, Daqing's reserves are typical of
much of China's oil in that it is scattered in numerous thin pockets that are difficult to
extract. By 1977, Daqing production was declining, as the remaining oil reserves
required a higher technical ability than China possessed to maintain production levels.
During the 1980's, China sought and received an infusion of technology and
assistance from Western oil companies. Production increased slightly for a few years, but
the field has experienced 0% growth since 1985 despite the continuous addition of new
wells. A similar situation exists at China's second largest field, Shengli and many other
large, older fields. Daqing and Shengli are extremely important to China as the two fields
together account for 52% of China's onshore oil production. 136
As these two fields began to decline, China started looking elsewhere for oil. The
greatest hopes have been placed on the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang Province. Early
136 Fereidun Fesharaki and Kang Wu, "Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry Through
Reorganization: Will it Work?," Oil and Gas Journal 96, no. 32 (August 10, 1998): 35.
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estimates for this area put oil reserves in the neighborhood of 10 billion tons, and Beijing
saw this as the solution to all of China's energy problems. However, as is often the case
in China, reality has not kept pace with rhetoric, and more recent estimates of the Tarim's
potential reserves by Western oil companies have been as low as 30 million tons. 137 Yet
this estimate may be unreasonably low. The true situation is difficult to predict, as
exploration and production in the Tarim Basin is extremely difficult, due to the
inhospitable climate of the Taklimakan Desert.
The situation has been further hampered by the remote western location. Until
quite recently, there was only one single track railway to the region which limited the
transport of exploration and drilling equipment into Xinjiang and the flow of oil out.
Expansion of production in the area can be directly correlated with the expansion of the
rail line, which has spread deeper into the Tarim and allowed further drilling. 138
Additionally, the line was upgraded to double track in late 1995, which more than
doubled the freight capacity into and out of the region. In 1990, total oil output of the
Tarim Basin was 150,000 tons. This number rose to over 5 million tons in 1996,
demonstrating that there are some viable fields in the area when logistics allows them to
be exploited. McCreary et al calls the Tarim "currently China's only hope of minimizing
oil imports." 139
137 Ahmed Rashid and Trish Saywell, "Beijing Gusher: China Pays Hugely to Bag Energy Supplies
Abroad," Far Eastern Economic Review 161, no. 9 (February 26, 1998): 46-50, specifically 47.
138 McCreary etal, II-9.
139 Ibid.
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Bejing agrees, and has continued aggressive exploration. China's National Star
Petroleum Corporation (China Star) just recently announced the discovery of a new field
in the basin with reserves estimated to be over 100 million tons. The China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) announced the discovery of a gas pocket believed to be in
excess of 160 billion cubic meters. 140 All together, China claims that after nine years of
exploration and development, they have discovered ten oil and gas fields with reserves of
600 million tons of oil. 141 Beijing expects to raise this total to 900 million tons and
expand annual production to 18 million tons by 2000. 142 These estimates are probably
high, as most previous government figures have proven to be. The Beijing Review offers
a slightly more believable estimate for the Tarim Basin, putting proven oil reserves at 230
million tons and gas reserves at 100 billion cubic meters. 143 The recent successes in
exploration do, however, restore some of the previous hope for the region. Yet the
answer to whether or not the Tarim Basin will be China's energy salvation will be a long
time in coming. Short term, it seems clear that production will increase, but not at a pace
sufficient to prevent imports from climbing.
140
'Tarim Basin Set to Become China's Largest Energy Source," Asia Pulse (October 13, 1998).
141
"Present Situation in Tarim Oilfields," (Beijing) Jingji Cankao Bao in Chinese (August 4, 1998): 5,
FBIS Document ID FTS 19980825000669.
142
"Xinjiang to Accelerate Petroleum Production," (Urumqi, Xinjiang) People's Radio Network in
Mandarin (1230 GMT, July 20, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS19980808001471.
143 Wei Bian, "Oil Industry Enjoys Great Potential for Development," Beijing Review 41, no. 25 (June
22, 1998): 15.
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China's other hopeful areas for domestic oil production are in its offshore fields,
principally in the South China Sea and the Bohai Gulf. The China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) anticipates total production for 1996 to reach 16.5 million tons. 144
Most of the fields contributing to this total are still relatively new and are expanding
production, which allows this total to continue climbing. Expansion of these fields is
underway, and more pockets of oil and gas are still being discovered. New wells were
recently added in the Bohai Gulf, and a new field was recently discovered in the Pearl
River Basin. 145 The fields in the eastern South China Sea, which only began production
in 1990, have stepped up output and are nearing an annual production of 3 million
tons. 146
Increases offshore and at Tarirn are quite promising—as well as some smaller
successes—but so far, what limited increases in production that have been achieved are
insufficient to even offset the declining production from the older, maturing oil fields. So
far, they have shown no ability to meet any increased demand. Assuming Tarim and the
offshore fields meet their production goals for this year of 5 million and 16.5 million
tons, respectively, these two together represent only 13.5% of the total domestic
144
"Official Anticipates Rise in Offshore Oil Production," (Beijing) Xinhua (1257 GMT, September
11, 1 998), FBIS Document ID FTS 199809 11 0007 19.
145 "PRC stepping up Bohai Oilfield Development," (Beijing) Xinhua (0816, July 8, 1998), FBIS
Document ED FTS 199807080002 13; "New Oil Field Found in Pearl River Basin," (Beijing) Xinhua (0700,
September 21, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 1998092 10001 28.
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"South China See Oilfield Output Exceeds 50 Million Tons," Asia Pulse (September 3, 1998).
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production of 1996. 147 This number is also less than China's 1996 net imports of crude
and oil products, which reached almost 23 million tons. 148
Beijing is hoping to drastically increase oil production in the coming years but
even the more optimistic government predictions put 2010 production at only 200
Mtons. 149 This number is probably too high. As the Guoji Shangbao article which listed
this figure stated, "China's existing oil supply capability is actually very close to the
maximum domestic oil production level... [therefore] the prospect of relying on domestic
resources for increased supply is slim." 150 Even if this goal is achieved, China will fall
way short of the level of production needed for oil to maintain its current share of the
TCEC without any increases in imports. As table 4. shows, the gap between the required
levels and possible production would be almost 75 million tons assuming low growth,
147 1996 production data is from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory web page,
http://www.pnL/gov/china.
148 Crude oil imports were 22.62 Mtons, while exports were 15.82 Mtons. Oil product imports were
20.33 Mtons and exports were 4.18 Mtons. Like many large countries China both imports and exports coal
and oil. This is due to geographic distribution and to provide an exchange of foreign capital. As already
discussed, much of China's resources are poorly located for China to fully utilize them, and it is often easier
for areas with high demand, located near a seaport to import energy rather than rely on indigenous sources.
Most import figures given in the remainder of this thesis will refer to net figures. These figures are from
"Petroleum Imports and Exports," China Petroleum News, as reported by Internet Securities, Inc (ISI),
Emerging Markets (November 17, 1997). Report is obtainable though not routinely available at:
http://www.securities.com.
149 See "Profile China's Petroleum Industry (Oct 1998)," Asia Pulse (October 15, 1998). Also "Key
Issues of Energy Development Strategy," (Beijing) Guoji Shanbao in Chinese (July 10, 1998): 6, FBIS
Document ED FTS 19980925001 692. This source is the less optimistic of the two, using 200 Mtons as a
high goal, while predicting actual production somewhere between 160-200.
150
"Key Issues of Energy Development Strategy."
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and 266 million tons assuming high growth. These differences will have to be made up
by increased imports.
Year Low Growth Hi Growth Projected
1996 158.675 158.675 N/A
1997 165.022 171.369 N/A
1998 171.623 185.079 N/A
1999 178.488 199.885 N/A
2000 185.627 215.876 N/A
2001 193.052 233.146 N/A
2002 200.774 251.797 N/A
2003 208.805 271.941 N/A
2004 217.158 293.696 N/A
2005 225.844 317.192 N/A
2006 234.878 342.567 N/A
2007 244.273 369.973 N/A
2008 254.044 399.571 N/A
2009 264.206 431.536 N/A
2010 274.774 466.059 200.000
Table 4. Required Annual Domestic Oil Production (Millions of tons)
C. NATURAL GAS
China's natural gas industry is in its virtual infancy. Throughout the 1970's and
early 1980' s, Beijing focused its attention on oil and essentially ignored natural gas.
Exploration in the country was minimal, and little investment was made in gas
infrastructure. When in the 1990's it became clear that oil could no longer solve all of
China's energy problems, and the externalities of coal usage began to gain attention,
natural gas resurfaced.
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Since then, there has been a great deal of exploration by China's state run oil
companies, and some by outside companies, with reasonable success. Coal, oil, and gas
are usually present in similar geological structures, therefore, based on China's reserves
of the first two, it was assumed that the country would have extensive gas reserves as
well. Most major oil producing countries extract gas and oil in an approximately 1:1
ratio. China's current gasioil recovery ratio is 0.107:1. 151 It is widely believed that this
ratio can be rapidly expanded.
Exploration has found much of the expected gas, but China is not yet willing to
commit any major portion of its energy needs to gas. In 1996, it supplied only 2% of
China's energy. This is due to a variety of reasons. Without a reliable long-term supply,
China is reluctant to shift many energy users over to natural gas despite its environmental
benefits. Environmental groups try to show how switching China's electrical generating
industry from coal to natural gas would be beneficial for China as well as her neighbors
due to its environmental benefits. Such an idea is central to all plans for helping China
reduce emissions. Other analysts try to show how natural gas plants entail lower capital
costs than coal plants. 152
While China is aware of these claims, security of the energy supply is the number
one priority and a secure natural gas supply is not yet available. The limited supply that is
151 McCreary et al, JJ-12.
152 See for example Jeffrey Logan and William Chandler, "Natural Gas Gains Momentum," The China
Business Review (Jul-Aug 1998): 40-44; also "China: It Takes Just One Spark," The Economist Intelligence
Unit (September 28, 1998), Available [Online]: Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/ CURNWS/China and
natural gas. [October 14, 1998]
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available in China is viewed as too valuable for power generation. Instead the majority of
it is used in fertilizer production as this is seen as essential to helping feed China's huge
population. The small remainder is used in a variety of applications, largely in household
heating. 153 Related to this problem is the expensive infrastructure needed to support
increased gas usage in China. Even once dependable reserves are secured, transporting
gas requires either extensive pipelines or liquefaction facilities. Construction of these
raises the cost for China to take a "leap of faith" to gas. 154
An additional obstacle to China expanding gas usage is the emphasis on using the
state owned oil companies to develop indigenous reserves. Natural gas requires more
sophisticated technology to exploit than oil, and the state owned oil companies have little
experience in this area, and are having little success. Outside observers say that for China
to overcome this obstacle, they must open prime parcels for exploration by outside firms.
Today, parcels are only opened to Western firms after the state owned companies have
explored them. This limits success and delays production.
Another side effect of China's desire to internalize the gas industry is that gas
prices are fixed artificially low in China. The current international market price of natural
gas is about $100 (U.S.) per 1300 cubic yards and China's internal price is only about
$75. This makes it difficult to attract as many outside companies as the country needs to
153 ian Johnson, "For Chinese, Natural Gas is Growing in Importance," Wall Street Journal, (August
26, 1998): A19.
154 The required faith is in the belief that China's relations with the developed world will remain as
favorable as they are today. China's aversion to dependence on outside powers makes a reliance on gas
seem undesirable, at least until China can further develop its own gas industry.
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develop questionable fields since they see no financial incentive to enter China's
market. 155
Despite these obstacles, China desperately needs to develop the gas industry to
absorb growing energy needs. Aware of this, Beijing has become more proactive in
exploiting opportunities. Though gas production in 1997 was only 21 billion cubic
meters (cu m), officials have set ambitious goals of 72 billion cu m by 2010, and 95 cu m
by 2020. These goals are likely unachievable under the current approach, but Beijing
seems committed to taking the necessary action to attract foreign investment to transform
the industry. 156
This changing attitude is paying off, as there have been some recent successes in
Chinese gas production. The most notable of these is the Yacheng-13 field located 90
kilometers off Hainan Island in the South China Sea. This field—which is estimated to
contain as much as 300 billion cu m of gas—began production in January 1996, providing
energy directly to Hong Kong's Black Point power plant. This success was only achieved
after a $1.1 billion investment that included construction of a 1050 kilometer sub-sea
pipeline, the second longest in the world. Additionally, the involvement of a western oil
155 For a review of these and other obstacles to further development of China's gas industry see Logan
and Chandler, "Natural Gas Gains Momentum." This article is further developed as Jeffrey Logan and
William Chandler, "Incentives Needed for Foreign Participation in China's Natural Gas Sector," Oil and
Gas Journal 96, no. 32 (August 10, 1998): 50-56. See also Keun-Wook Paik and Quan Lan, "China Preps
to Expand Gas Output and Distribution Amid Challenges," Oil and Gas Journal 96, no. 29 (July 20, 1998):
27-32; "China's Gas Quest," Energy Economist, no. 199 (May 1998): 8-12; and "China: It Takes Just One
Spark."
156 Paik and Quan.
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company, in this case ARCO, was necessary to make this field productive. 157 The
success of this venture, makes this appear as a good model for China to duplicate
—
partnering with a Western oil company to obtain technology and expertise, while
retaining control.
On a smaller scale, there have been other success stories. The Qaidam Basin in
Qinghai Province is a notable example. This field is approximately half the size of the
Yacheng field but supplies gas to 40% of the houses in the city of Golmud. Pipeline
extensions are also under construction to supply Dunhuang and the provincial capital
Xining. Further plans include connecting the industrial city of Lanzhou. 158 Successes
have also occurred in the East China Sea, and in Sichuan and Xinjiang Provinces. 159
These advances, while encouraging, are merely baby steps along the path that
China could take. Natural gas is still an essentially untapped resource in the country that
could offer a solution to much of China's energy needs. It is likely that China will have
difficulty increasing production enough for natural gas to retain its current share of 2% of
TCEC. Under low growth, this would require total supply of 74. 1 bn cu m in the year
157 See "Country's Largest Offshore Gas Field Introduced," (Hong Kong) Zhongguo Tongxun She in
Chinese (0754 GMT, September 29, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 1998 100 1000727; also Kari Huus,
"Perseverance Pays: ARCO Will Profit from Patience in Chinese Gas Venture, " Far Eastern Economic
Review 159, no. 1 (December 28 1995-January 4, 1996): 120-122.
158 Johnson.
159
"Pudong New Area to Burn Natural Gas From East China Sea," (Beijing) Xinhua (1236 GMT,
August 18, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 199808 18000738; "First Offshore Oil and Gas Well Sunk in
East China Sea," Asia Pulse (October 14, 1998); "New Natural Gas Field Holds 100 Billion Cubic Meters,"
(Beijing) Xinhua (0225 GMT, September 30, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 19980929001640; "Large Gas
Field Discovered in Xinjiang" (Beijing) Xinhua (0909 GMT, August 7, 1998), FBIS Document ID
FTS19980807001481.
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2010. Assuming high growth, this would require supply of 125.7 bn cu m. Assuming
China achieves the production goal of 72 bn cu m, this will leave a gap that must be filled
by imports of 2.1 bn cu m under low growth and 53.7 under high. China can probably
meet most of these needs through planned import scenarios that will be discussed in
Chapter VII However, unless China changes its approach and takes steps to aid the
development of its indigenous gas industry, this potentially helpful energy source will not
assume any greater percentage of China's consumption. If the high growth rate occurs, its
share will either fall, or imports will have to increase. In either of these scenarios,
natural gas seems destined to follow oil down the path of becoming a source where China
must depend on imports. The tragedy is, that this does not have to occur. It is the fear
that it will that prevents China from committing enough demand to gas to justify the
investment needed for increased production to prevent these fears from being realized.
China likely has sufficient gas reserves to support heavy increases in production, but
lacks the will.
Most analysts would like to see this share expanded, and of all of China's
available energy options, gas is the one that could most likely be expanded. Increased
usage here could possibly shift China more away from coal and lessen the long-term
impact of oil imports. This would benefit China by providing a secure fuel source and it
would benefit the world through reduced environmental degradation. Unfortunately, as
mentioned, expanding the role of natural gas in China faces many obstacles. This is one
area where the policies of the U.S. and other foreign governments can help influence
84
China's choices. By providing technology assistance to expand the gas industry and
encouraging its use in the short-term, China can be shown the benefits of this resource
without seeing it as a weakness.
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VI. OTHER ENERGY SOURCES
A. HYDROELECTRIC POWER
Hydroelectric power is already an important energy source in China providing
22% of the installed generating capacity and 17% of the actual electricity generated in
1995 160 it js ^ attractive energy source for a number of reasons. First, "hydropower is a
clean, non-polluting, reliable, long-lasting and renewable energy source." 161 This is one
way of mitigating fears of increases in acid rain and GHG emissions in China's future
plans. Second, "China has the most abundant hydropower resources in the world, with an
estimated potential [of] 380 gigawatts." 162 To date, barely 50 GW of this has been
tapped, meaning a vast potential still remains. Third, China is capable of producing most
hydropower turbines and other components without outside assistance. This and the fact
that once dams are built, they require no external fuel supply makes this an apparently
secure energy source for China.
Because of these positive aspects, China has embarked on an ambitious program
of hydropower construction. Taking advantage of a presently favorable international
160 This represents generation at 77% of capacity. This is due to seasonal variations in water flows
that prevent China's hydroelectric plants from using the full capacity year-round.
161 Richard Hunt and Judith Hunt, "Hydropower: Turning Water Into Light," Chemistry and Industry
no. 6 (March 16, 1998): 227.
162 Logan et al, 30. See also McCreary et al, 11-14. This potential is the amount considered
exploitable out of a theoretical potential of 680 GW. Many proponents of hydropower will refer to the
higher number, which overstates the possibilities in China.
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climate, China has opened up this market to outside firms to increase the rate of growth in
the industry. According to a senior official with the State Power Corporation of China,
the country has completed 13 projects with a combined generating capacity of 5.62 GW
and is currently working on five more with a capacity of 8.1 GW using 2.88 billion
dollars (U.S.) in foreign investment. 163 Beijing is willing to use foreign investment to
further development, despite the fear of increased outside influence, because it knows that
if the outside world tries to isolate China again, the country will still have the dams,
without having to repay the investment. Not that this is in China's plans, but that is why
this reliance on outside assistance is not seen as threatening to Chinese security.
Today, China's largest power supplier is a hydropower project. The Ertan
Hydropower Station on the Yalong River in Sichuan Province has a capacity of 3.3 GW.
This dam, which is still in the finishing stages, used 1.78 billion dollars (U.S.) in foreign
investment to speed its completion. This dam, which is the second tallest in Asia and the
third tallest in the world, began generating electricity on August 12, 1998. 164
This station is being hailed as a model as China expands plans for further
development. Among other sites, China intends to build 20 more projects along the
163
"Foreign Funds Boosting Hydropower Development," (Beijing) Xinhua (1100 GMT, July 13,
1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 19980713000862.
164 For more information on the Ertan Dam, see "Ertan Hydropower Station PRC's Biggest Electric
Supplier," (Beijing) Xinhua (1322 GMT, August 11, 1998) FBIS Document ID FTS 19980811000638;
"China's Major Power Plant Starts Generating Electricity," (Beijing) Xinhua (1244 GMT, August 12, 1998)
FBIS Document ID FTS 19980812000619; "Xinhua Backgrounder: Ertan Hydropower Station," (Beijing)
Xinhua (1106 GMT, August 13, 1998) FBIS Document ID FTS 19980813000655; and "Demand for
China's Largest Power Station Outlined," (Beijing) Xinhua (0655 GMT, August 17, 1998) FBIS Document
ID FTS 19980817000141.
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Yalong River with a combined capacity of 23.7 GW. 165 One of these, the Jinping facility
will be the world's highest concave-shaped dam at 325 meters, and it will have a capacity
of 3.66 GW. 166 There are also plans to build 13 dams along the upper Yellow River. The
first of these was the Lijiaxia Hydropower Plant in Qinghai Province with a capacity of 2
GW, which began generating electricity in August 1997. Three plants are envisioned for
the Qingjiang River. The first, completed in 1994, was the Geheyan Station in Hubei
Province with a capacity of 1.2 GW. The second—the Gaobazhou Station—began
construction in 1997 and will have a capacity of 252 MW. Plans call for Southwestern
China's Hongshui River to see ten projects. The first of these is the 1.2 GW
Tianshengquiao facility which is nearing completion. 167 The country is also building
numerous smaller dams, still often utilizing foreign investment. An example of this can
be found in the recently announced plans for a 45 MW dam on the Getu River in Guizhou
Province, using 60 million dollars (U.S.) in foreign money. 168
All of these projects are dwarfed by China's grandest scheme: the Three Gorges
Dam. This project will be the largest dam in the world, and will have 26 high capacity
165
"Plans Call for 20 New Power Stations on Yalong River," (Beijing) Xinhua (0313 GMT, August
20, 1998) FBIS Document ID FTS 19980819001672.
166 "PRC t0 Build world's Highest Concave-Shaped Dam," (Beijing) Xinhua (1 144 GMT, August 21,
1998) FBIS Document ED FTS 19980821000706.
167 For more on these projects, see "Hydroelectricity and Other Renewable Sources," in International
Energy Outlook 1998.
168
"China, U.S. to Build Hydropower Station in Guizhou," (Beijing) Xinhua (0110 GMT, August 29,
1998) FBIS Document ED FTS 19980828001534.
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turbines producing 18 GW of electricity. This huge dam on the Yangzi River is
scheduled for completion in 2009. The magnitude of this dam has revealed some of the
drawbacks of hydropower in China. The project requires the relocation of 1.2 million
people from 19 cities, 150 towns, and 4,500 villages that will be swamped by the planned
570 feet deep reservoir that is expected to reach 650 km upriver. Archaeologists and
historians have been scrambling to search the 50,000 acres of land that will be submerged
to record all historic sites before they are hidden forever.
Many people question whether the project will be successful due to the high level
of silt in the Yangzi River. Critics claim this will clog the turbines and limit the dam's
generating capacity. Officials admit they have not yet fully overcome this problem, and
when questioned about this obstacle, they tend to redirect attention to the expected
benefits of the project. These include—in addition to the much needed electricity
—
increased navigation of the upper Yangzi River, and improved flood control for the lower
Yangzi Valley. The positive benefits of both of these are also unproven and this dam has
many opponents. Regardless, Beijing is pressing ahead with construction. 169
The challenges of this project will also apply to many other large hydropower
dams in China, although to a lesser extent. This may increase the value of building many
smaller dams instead of a reliance on such grandiose schemes. Another factor to effect
that trend is the geographical mismatch between potential hydropower sites and needed
169 For a review of some of the challenges and expected benefits of the Three Gorges Dam, see John
Bryan Starr, Understanding China: A Guide to China 's Economy, History, and Political Structure, (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1997), 173-180; Alexander Kuo "Breaking the Wall," Harvard International Review
20, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 28-31; and "Hydroelectricity and Other Renewable Resources," 7-11.
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demand for electricity. Most of the promising sites are in southwestern China, in remote
mountainous areas. Construction here is quite difficult, especially for projects large
enough to provide power on a scale to warrant transmission to distant eastern provinces
where the demand is greatest. The eastern and northeastern provinces possess only 6% of
China's hydropower potential. This mismatch, and China's poor power transmission
infrastructure will prevent the entire theoretical potential from being exploited.
Further, another factor that favors the use of smaller dams is that while China's
indigenous ability to build dams is quite respectable, the country cannot yet manufacture
high capacity power turbines needed in large dams. These are all coming from foreign
suppliers today. If China finds itself isolated again, smaller dams will become more
attractive. Hydropower can be most beneficial in helping to increase electrification in
rural areas and alleviate some regional needs through the construction of numerous
modest sized dams. Already, small hydroelectric stations power more than 40 local
power grids. This number will likely increase as this is a secure, relatively inexpensive
way to meet expanding energy needs in remote areas.
Despite the obstacles, China's announced hydroelectric plans call for an increase
of 3.5 GW of capacity each year through 1999, and an increase of 5 GW per year from
2000 through 2010. 170 Table 5. Projects required capacity to maintain the current 22% of
total capacity under high and low growth rates in the business as usual scenario, and
projected capacity based on announced plans. If these plans are all met, China will have
170
"Foreign Funds Boosting Hydropower Development.'
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27.5 GW or 30.5% excess capacity in 2010 under the low growth scenario. This would
allow hydropower to increase its share of the total projected electricity demand to 29%.
Assuming the high growth rate, China will have a capacity shortfall of 35.2 GW or 23%
in 2010. This would mean hydropower' s contribution would fall to 17%. The difference
here will determine whether or not hydropower can help ease the demand coal-fired
electrical plants by filling a larger share of total capacity. If low growth occurs, the
excess capacity would allow China to preclude the use of 29.6 Mtons of coal, whereas if
high growth occurs, the resulting gap would require approximately 37.9 Mtons of coal to
assume that demand. 171
Year Low Growth (4%) High Growth (8%) Planned Growth
1997 54.08 56.16 55.50
1998 56.24 60.65 59.00
1999 58.49 65.50 62.50
2000 60.83 70.74 67.50
2001 63.26 76.40 72.50
2002 65.79 82.51 77.50
2003 68.42 89.11 82.50
2004 71.16 96.24 87.50
2005 74.01 103.94 92.50
2006 76.97 112.26 97.50
2007 80.05 121.24 102.50
2008 83.25 130.94 107.50
2009 86.58 141.42 112.50
2010 90.04 152.73 117.50
Table 5. Required and Planned Growth in Hydroelectric Generation Capacity (GW)
171 This assumes a capacity factor of 0.3 for hydropower plants and 0.65 for coal-fired plants. An
average Chinese coal plant uses 410 tons of coal per Gwh or electricity generated. Figures provided by
Jeffrey Logan, AISU, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
92
B. NUCLEAR POWER
Another possible source of energy for China—one that is even more fraught with
political pitfalls—is nuclear energy. Despite downfalls, this route shows great promise to
China due to its inherent efficiency and an internal supply source. China's current
uranium reserves are roughly 1.7 billion tons, representing a relatively cheap, and very
secure source of power. The cost of transporting uranium is one-hundred-thousandth of
that for the volume of coal yielding the same energy. 172 A single truck can transport 160
metric tons of uranium, which can fuel an average power plant for five years. A typical
thermal power plant requires five train-loads of coal every day. Also, China's uranium
reserves are scattered in over 200 deposits throughout much of the country, providing a
ready resource almost anywhere. Increased reliance on this fuel source could provide
some relief for China's overburdened transportation infrastructure, and help reduce coal
bottlenecks. This makes nuclear power look very attractive to China.
Today, nuclear power accounts for only about one percent of China's total
electrical generation capacity. This is due to China's relatively late entry into the civilian
nuclear arena, with the first power plant just becoming operational in 1993. This plant
—
the Qinshan plant in Zhejiang Province—was a timid first step. It is a single pressurized
water reactor (PWR) of Chinese design, with a generating capacity of 300 MW. 173 This
172
"One Kilogram (kg) of uranium produces up to 50,000 Kilowatt Hours (kwh) of electricity, while
one kg of coal produces only up to 3 kwh of electricity." Spodak, 25.
173 For details on China's nuclear industry and future potential, see Logan et al.
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was primarily a study of feasibility to show China's ability to design and build a modern
nuclear power plant. The second facility—at Daya Bay in Guangdong Province—was a
much larger unit, comprising two 900 MW PWR reactors of French design. This facility
became operational in 1994.
There are currently four more plants under construction comprising eight reactors
with a combined generating capacity of 6.65 GW. These plants are scheduled to become
operational between 2003 and 2005. This represents a substantial commitment to
increase the role of nuclear power in China, but is only a small step towards the ambitious
goals set out in China's ninth five-year plan. That document planned to raise the current
nuclear generating capacity of 2.1 GW to 50 GW by 2020 and 150 GW by 2050. 174
These goals were seen as overly optimistic due to the extensive capital requirement and
long construction time for nuclear facilities. In actuality, China will probably build one
plant per year through 2010, then possibly three to four per year thereafter. 175 Projections
for the tenth five-year plan put the target for 2020 at 40 GW. 176
As with many other technological solutions to China's energy needs, nuclear
power's potential is partially limited by China's production capabilities. The country has
a demonstrated ability to design and build safe nuclear plants, but approximately 30% of
174 Spodak, 26.
175 Peng Kai-lei, "Nation to Build 1 Nuclear Power Station Per Year," (Hong Kong) Wen Po in
Chinese (July 16, 1998): A2, FBIS Document ID FTS 19980720001510.
176 Si Liang, "U.S. European, and Japanese Corporations Are Marching Towards China's Nuclear-
Power Market," (Hong Kong) Zhongguo Tongxun She in Chinese (1107 GMT, July 23, 1998), FBIS
Document ID FTS 19980806003709
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the components in these plants are imported due to China's limited production ability.
Many of these components are relatively simple items, but they comprise specialty metals
with strict purity and quality control requirements that exceed current Chinese
capabilities. Aside from these limitations, the largest barrier to a truly indigenous nuclear
industry is China's inability to manufacture high capacity power turbines at a competitive
price. These items are similar to those used in large hydropower projects, so once again,
larger scale use of this energy source represents an increased reliance on outside
assistance.
This is, however, only a short-term obstacle, as China is attempting to upgrade its
turbine production abilities, largely through the use of technology transfers. Additionally,
this reliance would only be necessary during construction, and does not require any long-
term dependence. For these reasons, China is pressing ahead with nuclear expansion
plans while the rest of the world—with the notable exception of Japan—is scaling back
reliance on nuclear power. This expansion is one of many areas in China's future energy
plans that offer excellent business opportunities for outside firms. 177 If the U.S. refuses
to deal with China in this arena due to proliferation fears, European and Russian firms
will not share such reservations, and China will proceed on course, with the only losers in
the deal being U.S. companies.
177 Ibid. Also Si Liang, "U.S. European, and Japanese Corporations Are Marching Towards China's
Nuclear-Power Market," and "Korea, U.S., Japan Compete for China's Nuke Power Plants," Asia Pulse
(October 27, 1998).
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This increased reliance on nuclear power frightens many observers, so a look at
some of the potential problems is warranted. The first concern is the level of safety at
Chinese facilities. Memories of Chernobyl cause valid questioning of whether China
possesses an adequate level of technological ability to make safe plants. Aware of these
fears, China has emphasized safety in all of its nuclear plans. 178 Three of the four new
facilities will be built by western companies (French, Canadian, and Russian) or with
assistance by them using foreign designs. This will give China's fledgling nuclear
industry more time and assistance to develop internationally accepted practices in the
construction of their plants.
Since 1981, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been assisting
China in updating and enforcing new safety regulations and standards. China is moving
toward standardization in its future plants, something that is seen as a positive step in
improving safety. Additionally, China cooperates openly with International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to help prevent accidents and limit proliferation
possibilities. 179 While not guaranteeing there will be no Chinese Chernobyl, these steps
show that China is aware of the potential hazards of nuclear power and is addressing the
dangers.
178 For a discusison of the importance Chinese leaders put on safety in their nuclear plans, see "China
Goes All Out to Ensure Safety of Nuclear Plants," Asia Pulse (September 23, 1998).
179 See Gerald L. Epstein et al, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Office of Technology Assessment Publication OTA-ISS-615 (April 1995).
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A second issue with nuclear power is the generation and disposal of nuclear
waste. There are two separate concerns here. The first is the problem of finding a
suitable, long-term solution for disposing of waste expected to remain radioactive for
thousands of years. A viable answer to this problem has yet to be found in any country,
and it is unlikely that China will develop one that can satisfy international critics. 180 The
second concern with waste from nuclear plants is the generation of plutonium. All
commercial reactors produce some plutonium. The newer ones do not produce it directly,
but do produce waste that can be reprocessed to produce plutonium, which can then be
used to make nuclear weapons. 181 While China is already a declared nuclear state with
the world's third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, this stockpile is relatively small.
Many fear that this could change if China increases reliance on nuclear power. Another
great concern is that even if China does not increase its stockpiles, this plutonium could
spread to non-nuclear nations. As will be seen, China is willing to deal with Iran and Iraq
when they see benefits from doing so. These two countries, as well as North Korea, are
among those who seem to possess genuine nuclear plans.
While many groups like those cited above stress these dangers, there are probably
few causes for immediate concern. Even the NCI admits that China has an extremely
180 por a review of the various options for the disposal of nuclear waste, see Liu, 1 14-1 19.
1°1 See numerous reports of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research available at
http://www.ieer.org, particularly, Arjun Makhijani, "Nuclear Power: No Solution to Global Climate
Change" and "Fissile Material Basics." See also Paul Leventhal, "The Plutonium Industry and the
Consequences for a Comprehensive Fissile Materials Cutoff," from the Nuclear Control Institute,
http://www.nci.org.
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small plutonium stockpile—smaller even than Japan, Germany, and France—and does
not have a commercial reprocessing plant. The Chinese possess the technology to build
one, but have not done so, indicating they are satisfied with their nuclear deterrent
capability and prefer neither a more offensive nuclear posture, nor to violate the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by exporting plutonium. 182 Although there are recent
signs that China wants to upgrade its nuclear forces, there is no evidence to suggest that
they need a substantially larger stock of plutonium to accomplish this. 183
Whatever the true dangers or obstacles, it is clear that China will expand its use of
nuclear power. To them, it represents a very secure and affordable energy source.
Opponents of nuclear power will offer rather convincing arguments against the
affordability aspect. In particular, IEER repeatedly attempts to show how a combined
cycle natural gas power plant is in all ways more affordable and dependable than a
nuclear plant. 184 The weakness in selling this to China is it ignores the fact that China
has extensive uranium, eliminating (or at least minimizing) fueling costs. Conversely, as
seen, China does not yet have a dependable source of natural gas. The infrastructure
182 por further discussion of China and the fears of proliferation, see Robert S. Ross, "Why Our
Hardliners are Wrong," The National Interest, no. 49 (Fall 1997): 42-51; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright,
and Yong Liu, "China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off," Survival 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995-1996):
147-167; Mitchel B.Wallerstein, "China and Proliferation: A Path Not Taken?," Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn
1996): 58-66; and Congress, House, Implementation of the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement:
Whose Interests are Served?, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, 105 th Congress, 1 st
session, October 7, 1997.
183 An alternative view on the issue of nuclear waste in China can be found in William Spodak's
"Power Struggle." This article downplays the dangers of nuclear waste, and makes the handling appear
quite simple.
184 BEER, "Nuclear Power: No Solution to Global Climate Change."
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requirements to realize one shift the economic balance back in the favor of nuclear power.
Also, China has projected an ability to build nuclear plants at a cost far below the world
average. 185 More importantly to China—and this is an argument that environmentalists
cannot really refute—is security. Once built, nuclear plants require minimal foreign
assistance. Natural gas will not be as secure anytime in the next 30 years.
Having seen that nuclear power holds an important place in China's energy future,
it is now possible to determine the extent of that position. The goal of 40 GW by 2010
would allow nuclear power to service 10% of the total electricity demand in the low
growth scenario, and 6% in the high growth. The original goal of 50 GW would raise the
numbers to 12% and 7%. The difficulty is that both of these goals are likely
unachievable. The four facilities currently planned or under construction are the only
plants that are likely to be operational before 2005. The largest of these plants is 2 GW.
As the Peng Kai-lei article cited above noted, a realistic plan has China completing one
plant per year until 2010. Assuming the four planned facilities are all completed in 2004
(or before), and one plant per year is completed through 2010, each of these with a 2 GW
capacity, the total nuclear capacity in 2010 would only be 20.75 GW. The goal of 40 GW
could only be achieved if the construction schedule is doubled after 2004, or plants of 4
GW are constructed. Logan et al cites a government prediction of 20GW by 2010. That
report even considers this goal unlikely, though as seen, it is closer to realistic. The
International Energy Outlook 1998 projects a nuclear capacity of only 11.5 GW by
185 Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: Update 1992, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (Paris: OECD, 1992), 63.
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20 10. 186 This seems to be a low estimate, probably based only on firm construction
plans. Achieving this goal is certainly possible, as it would only require the construction
of 2-3 plants between 2005-2010.
For nuclear power to maintain its current 1% share of China's electricity
production, a capacity of only 4 GW assuming low growth and 6.8 GW assuming high
growth would be required. If the projected capacity of 20.75 GW is achieved, this will
leave an excess capacity of 16.75 GW assuming low growth, and an excess of 13.95
under high growth. According to Si Liang, the 40 GW goal was based on a desire to raise
nuclear power's contribution to 5%. This would require 20 and 34 GW of capacity for
the low and high growth rates, respectively. It is now clear that the first of these is
achievable, while the second is doubtful. Therefore if the low growth scenario proves the
actual course, then nuclear power will likely assume about a 5% share, while if high
growth occurs the contribution will be closer to 3%. This will allow China to forego the
use of 40-48 Mtons of coal. 187 In either event, the role of nuclear power will increase,
assuming the current growth plans continue.
186
"Nuciear Power," in International Energy Outlook 1998.
187 Assuming a capacity factor of 0.8 for nuclear power plants in China. Figure from Jeffrey Logan.
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C. RENEWABLE RESOURCES
Most remaining energy sources can be grouped into the category of renewable
resources, or simply "renewables." 188 These can be defined as "those resources that,
after being used, can be brought back to the original state without human effort."189
Renewables are most often praised due to their generally benign impact on the
environment. A less considered aspect is their contribution to energy security. This can
be significant, due to the lack of an external fuel requirement. These sources generally
use naturally occurring resources to produce energy, and by definition this supply is
generally replenishable, making these power sources able to be "self-contained" within a
country's borders.
The most common renewable with applications relevant to power generation is
hydropower. This source has moved out of the realm of alternative energy options and
has become a traditional power source. Its contributions in China were discussed in the
preceding chapter. This chapter instead will focus on the less common options that can
provide some potential in China. The most commercially viable options in this category
are wind, geothermal, and solar power. By 1995, China's installed capacity for these four
was 50 MW, 32 MW, and 6 MW, respectively. 190 These totals show the negligible
*-°° Except where noted, all figures for renewable energy usage and potential in China come from Li
Jungfeng, Yih-huei Wan, and James M. Ohi, "Renewable Energy Development in China: Resource
Assessment, Technology Status, and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential," Applied Energy 56, no. 3-4
(1997): 381-394.
189 Di-FeiLiu,6.
190 Logan et al, 6.
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impact that renewables have had in China's electrical industry. Yet this does not truly
capture either the potential of these sources or their true contributions to China's overall
energy picture. This will become clear as the specifics of each of these options, as well as
biomass and biogas, are explored.
In each case, it will be shown that these sources offer a great deal of potential in
China, and in most cases, some of this is already being tapped. However, these sources
fit mainly niche markets in remote, rural areas of China, and will contribute little directly
to China's national power grid. Their main contributions lie in increasing power in areas
not connected to the power grid, therefore preventing more traditional resources from
being expended in these areas. Today in China, renewables may reflect a miniscule
portion of the commercial electricity picture, but their usage in noncommercial areas
amounts to over 300 Mtoe per year. This amount is equal to more than one quarter of the
TPES and 47% of all rural energy usage. 191 For this reason, the role of these sources can
be substantial, and deserves an examination.
1. Wind Power
Wind power has much untapped theoretical potential in China. This total
potential is estimated by the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Science at 3,200 GW,
of which 253 GW is deemed technically exploitable. 192 This does not, however, make
191
"Headway Made in New, Renewable Energy Development," (Beijing) Xinhua (0216, July 16,
1998) FBIS Document ID FTS 199807 1500 1652.
192 As cited in Li, Wan, and Ohi, 383. Logan et al puts the toatl exploitable potential at 1600 GW, but
lists the same exploitable amount.
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wind power a reliable source for solving large-scale power needs in China. The main
difficulty in commercially exploiting this resource is that, simply put, "wind is not a
dependable resource." 193 "Wind speed varies naturally, with the hour of the day, the
month of the year, altitude, and of course, the site."194 China's drive for development
demands steady, consistent energy. This unpredictable source is unlikely to assume any
large-scale role in national power generation.
Further, much of this potential is in remote areas, specifically Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, and northern Gansu, although there is also great potential in the southeastern
offshore islands. This geographical distribution and the wind's inconsistency mean that
the most likely uses of wind in China's future are in upgrading electrification in rural
areas. Wind can offer a great deal here, as much of the areas with exploitable potential
are far removed from the national power grid. Using this—and other renewables—to
absorb some of this rural demand, relieves pressure to apply other, more conventional
sources to these remote areas, allowing more to go to the developed regions.
At the end of 1995, there were thirteen commercial wind power plants in China
ranging in capacity from 55 KW to 12.75 MW. The largest of these is at Dabancheng in
Xinjiang. There is one large plant in Guangdong Province, and two moderately sized
plants in Inner Mongolia. These are the only plants that have more than ten wind
generators. This small number of commercial plants and their limited size reflect the
193 Logan et al, 44.
194 Jorge Gutierrez-Vera, "Renewable in Mexico in the 21 st Century," IEEE Power Engineering
Review 18, no. 4 (April 1998): 16.
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limitations mentioned above. Also, large-scale wind power plants tend to be very costly,
averaging about $1000 (U.S.) per KW. This is compared to about $600 per KW for a
standard coal plant. 195
Another factor that relegates wind-power to peripheral areas of China is the
inability of Chinese industry to manufacture high capacity wind turbines. As with large
nuclear and hydropower turbines, China is forced to import units used for large scale
electricity production. Even in the more remote areas of China, the inconsistency of wind
makes it a poor choice as the sole electrical generation option. Wind is best used in
concert with other renewables or in hybrid systems that couple wind generators with
battery storage units and sometimes diesel engines.
China has, however, been a world leader in production of smaller generators and
hybrid systems (wind/PV, wind/diesel, or wind/diesel/battery). There are over forty
manufacturers of small wind generators in China, 17 of which are in Inner Mongolia.
These firms can produce 30,000 generators per year ranging in size from 50 W to 5 KW.
This production is geared to service a growing niche market in those areas with
exploitable potential. Today there are over 160,000 small wind generators in use in
China and this number will likely increase dramatically in rural areas. 196 This number
represents a total installed capacity of 17 MW that does not have to be fulfilled by other
energy sources.
195 Data on costs per KW for various systems is from Logan et al.
196
"Headway Made in New, Renewable Energy Development."
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Despite all of these shortcomings, wind power is rising in importance because of
its lack of negative environmental impact. Worldwide demand for wind systems is
growing, which is advancing the technology level available, and lowering the costs
involved. Capital costs will likely be closer to $750 per KW in the near future, making
the systems more attractive. Because of their "green" nature, and potential to raise rural
electrification levels, wind systems have been recently targeted by the World Bank and
other environmentally conscious organizations for their development projects.
China is one of many recipients of this type of funding, and in March of 1998,
Beijing and the World Bank announced plans to develop 190 MW of new wind power at
four sites. The planned locations are the Huitengxile field (100 MW) in Inner Mongolia,
the Zhangbei field (50 MW) in Hebei, the Pingtan field (20 MW) in Fujian, and the
Chongming field (20 MW) in Shanghai. 197 Because of China's turbine manufacturing
deficiencies, this new focus on wind power has opened up yet another area of China's
energy industry for opportunities for U.S. and other Western firms. 198
2. Geothermal
Geothermal power can be exploited in either of two ways. Geothermal sources of
very high temperature can be used in power generation. Lesser sources can be exploited
for direct heating applications. Sources suitable for electric power generation are only
197 Logan et al, 45. Also Qi Li, "Large-Scale Wind Power Projects Launched," (Beijing) Keji Ribao
in Chinese (July 23, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS19980812000818.
198 See "U.S. Firms to Explore Wind-Power Resources n Xinjiang," (Beijing) Xinhua (0033 GMT,
September 2, 1998) FBIS Document ID FTS 19980901001603.
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found in two places in China: Tibet and Yunnan (90% of the total is in Tibet199 ).
Estimates of the total capacity here exceed 6.7 GW, though only 30 MW has been
harnessed so far. 25 MW of this is at the Yangbajin thermal field in Tibet, which
supplies between 40 and 60 percent of power to the Lhasa grid, demonstrating the
viability of this source. These limited sources will prevent geothermal electricity from
assuming a significant role in any province other than Tibet. Like wind power,
geothermal' s main potential lies in noncommercial applications, through meeting energy
needs that would otherwise have to be eventually met by conventional sources.
One example of this is that China currently has 24% of the world total of installed
direct geothermal heating systems. Estimated output is about 2,410 MW, and this is
projected to grow at 8% per year in the ninth five-year plan. In 1995, direct heating
amounted to 5.1 million tee. This is expected to increase to 7.5 million in 2000 and 13.4
million by 2010. These systems are relatively simple to build and operate and have vast
potential throughout China, as most provinces have some exploitable geothermal sites.
Even if sites were more plentiful, geothermal electric systems require advanced
technology to fully exploit. Although China has been on the cutting edge of its
development, further exploitation of these systems would run into limitations due to
China's inefficient manufacturing concerns. The small opportunity for applying this
technology means that few firms are interested in building the required equipment, and
the resulting lack of competition is reflected through poor quality. Also, the limited
199 Logan et al, 33.
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demand for geothermal electric systems precludes economies of scale in the industry,
which tends to make the systems quite expensive, creating another barrier to increased
usage.
3. Solar
In 1997, the total solar power electrical generation capacity in China was a mere
5.5 MW, only 3 MW of which was from stations connected to the national power grid.
As with other renewables, this understates both solar power's current and potential usage
in China. These figures represent photo-voltaic (PV) plants only, which are the
commercial electric generating application of solar power. A more significant usage of
this energy is in solar water heaters. In 1994, China had an installed capacity of 3.3
million m2 of solar water heaters which saved an estimated 330,000-495,000 tee a year.
By the end of 1996, this number had risen to 5 million m2 (500,000-750,000 tee).200
China's ninth five-year plan calls for this capacity to increase to 13 million m by 2010.
This represents between 4.3 and 6.5 million tee. These systems are going to provide the
majority of domestic hot water in rural China's future, especially in areas with
inadequate, or no electrification systems. China also uses solar power for a variety of
other purposes, including 6 million m2 of household heating, 150,000 solar stoves, and
40,000 solar greenhouses used in agriculture.201
200
"Headway Made in New, Renewable Energy Development.
2°1 Ibid.
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Even the minimal usage of PV plants has potential to increase. China has been
developing PV technology since 1958, originally for space applications, and has a
moderate level of expertise in producing PV systems. These could be applied in
numerous remote areas, as two thirds of China actually receives enough solar insolation
to exploit this technology. The best areas for development are in north Ningxia, north
Gansu, east Xinjiang west Qinghai, and west Tibet. These areas all receive between
2,800 and 3,300 hours of sunshine annually with total insolation of 6.7-8.4 GJ/m2 .202
The main limitations in realizing much of this potential are poor quality control in the
Chinese PV systems,203 poor after installation maintenance and, until quite recently, the
prohibitively high cost of PV systems.
This has begun to change with recent advances in the industry. These are due to
an upsurge of demand world-wide, which is occurring for the same reasons as the
increased popularity of wind power. The new interest in using PV technology in
residential applications has shifted the paradigm of the PV industry. Previously, the quest
in production was to gain the highest energy conversion rate per given size of solar panel.
This led to a reliance on silicon based, single crystal cells. These cells are very expensive
to produce and consume vast amounts of energy in the manufacturing process.
202 This is approximately equal to 0.23-0.28 tee per m2 , meaning that every square meter of solar
panel could provide as much as 0.28 tee. Conversion factors are from the IEA web page.
203 This is not to imply that the Chinese are not capable of producing these systems. As noted above
they possess the technology and have made some good systems. The problem lies primarily in the
management of the manufacturing concerns with resulting poor consistency in production of a product that
demands precision.
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Recently, the goal has shifted to making less expensive cells, which changed the
focus to polycrystalline "thin film" cells. Both of these are less efficient than single cell
panels, but they are much easier and less expensive to produce. Also, the thin film cells
are flexible enough to be installed as a coating on roofing tiles or window panes. These
new applications have made single house PV systems financially viable in areas not
serviced by traditional electricity. Approximately 40,000 families in China have these
systems so far, and a part of the World Bank development initiative mentioned in the
discussion of wind power aims to supply these systems to 400,000 herdsman households
in northwest China.204
4. Biomass/Biogas
The use of wood and other natural products as an energy source is literally as old
as fire. This is the simplest application of biomass to solving energy needs—burning
wood or other residue for heat. In rural China, that is still how most families heat their
homes. Not only wood, but all manner of biomass is collected and burned for energy,
including crop residues, animal dung, leaves, dry grasses and sod. This is how many
Chinese have lived for centuries, and despite all the strides the PRC has made in its
development drive, over 300 million people in China still resort to this energy source to at
least partially meet basic needs.
204 See Ernesto N. Terrado, "Bringing Renewable Energy Concepts to Market Reality: The Solar
Initiative," IEEE Power Engineering Review 18, no. 5 (May 1998): 12-16. For a discussion of the type of
systems being used in China, see Trish Saywell, "Power to the People," Far Eastern Economic Review 161,
no. 5 (January 29, 1998): 36.
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This massive contribution of biomass is not considered in commercial energy
computations like TCEC. Because this fuel comes from sources that are not easily
quantified, the true extent of its contribution is difficult to estimate. One attempt using
indirect methods of estimating consumption puts the total biomass usage at around 117
mtce. 205 At first glance, this seems like a sensible and benign method of filling rural
energy needs. Unfortunately when a country with a population the size of China resorts
to burning "everything in sight" to meet basic cooking and heating needs, the amount of
materials consumed begins to have negative effects. Some obvious ones are deforestation
and soil erosion. A less obvious yet growing problem is that the burning of crop residues
instead of plowing them under deprives the soil of needed nutrients and reduces long-
term crop yields. This is something that a country with nearly a quarter of the world's
population and only 1% of the arable land can hardly afford. A final side effect is
increases in GHG emissions from the numerous unfiltered fires.206
Yet biomass has promise for the future, because there are more efficient ways of
using this resource than simply burning it in household stoves. One option is to collect
the mass, reprocess it and burn it in commercial boilers along with coal.207 This
205 Smil, 101-103.
206 por more on me limitations of biomass fuels, see Smil. Also Energy in Developing Countries, 100-
104.
207 For a discussion of this process and other technological renewable applications, see Renewable
Energy Technology Characterizations, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Utility Technologies Topical
Report No. TR-109496 (December 1997), Chapter 2, Available [Online]: http://www.eren.doe.gov/utilities/
techcharJitml.
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process—called cofiring—not only results in efficient use of biomass, it can also reduce
SO2 and NOx emissions 20-40% when compared to a standard coal plant. Unfortunately,
while this process has been successfully demonstrated in numerous tests in the U.S., it
will be years before the technology is commercially available anywhere, let alone in
China.
A more common process, known as biomass gasification, takes the wood and crop
residues and converts them into either methanol or ethanol.208 These gases can be used
in a variety of applications, including power generation, cooking, and heating. China has
been pursuing this avenue for decades, and today has the largest research and
development capacity in the field. As a result of this investment, China is a world leader
in the technology, and has over 600 biomass gasifier systems presently installed,
primarily in the furniture and timber drying industries. Each of these systems produces
about 175 KW of power, although plans are under development to develop large systems
capable of producing up to 800 KW. These systems produce power that is used in rural
villages not connected to a power grid.
A related process that can be applied on a small scale is anaerobic fermentation or
anaerobic digestion. This technique uses animal, human, and plant wastes to produce a
mixture of methane and carbon dioxide.209 This is simply capturing and controlling the
208 A thorough review of the biomass gasification process and a review of the various systems used in
China (and other developing countries) is presented in Fueling Development, 222.227. See also Smil, 104-
106.
209 See Fueling Development, 219-222. For a very simplistic review of the biology of the process and
sample designs for building a household digester, see David House, Biogas Handbook (Culver City, CA:
Peace Press, 1981).
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natural process of rotting wastes, like that which produces "swamp gas." This is a "low-
technology" technique that can done by an individual household to produce gas for
cooking, heating, or running a small electric generator. Aside from the energy provided,
this process has other benefits. According the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, it is
"the simplest and most practical method known for treating human and animal wastes to
minimize the public health hazard associated with their handling and disposal."210
Additionally, the waste product that is left at the completion of the process is a valuable
fertilizer.
Because of the simplicity of this process, this technique is already widely used in
rural China. By the end of 1994, there were 5.4 million household digesters in use
producing 1,270 million m 3 of biogas each year. Additionally, there are over 600 larger
installations which process waste from industrial concerns and provide biogas to 84,000
households, and 154 electric power generators with a combined capacity of about 3 MW.
While there is still much room for further extension of this technology in China, it will
encounter limits due to weather constraints. The digestion process does not occur when
the ambient temperature is too low. The relatively warm weather requirement restricts
this option to areas in southern China.
210 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Methane Generation from Human, Animal, and
Agricultural Wastes, Report of the Panel on Methane Generation of the Advisory Committee on
Technology Innovation of the Board on Science and Technology for International Development,
Commission on International Relations, NAS (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1977), 4.
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VII. OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA'S ENERGY FUTURE
A. GENERAL OBSTACLES
Meeting growing energy needs on the scope of those occurring in China would be
a daunting task in almost any country. In China, it is doubly so, due to a variety of
obstacles. Beijing's preference for self-reliance demands that indigenous energy supplies
be fully exploited to minimize dependence on imports. As documented in previous
chapters, this is not being accomplished. This chapter will begin by examining some of
the obstacles preventing China from more fully using its own energy reserves.
The most significant of these is an inadequate infrastructure
—
primarily
transportation, but also electrical—that is greatly overtaxed. Another problem that affects
many energy sources is the need for advanced technology and dependable technical
manufacturing ability. Related to this, because it makes getting outside assistance
difficult, is China's distorted energy market in which domestic oil and gas prices are fixed
at artificially low rates. A final obstacle is the need to ensure that any energy source on
which China relies is "secure." This requirement limits the amount of resources that
China will simply buy on the open market as this route may not be available in times of
crisis.
1. Infrastructure Deficiencies
Many of China's possible energy sources cannot be fully exploited due to
geography. As stated in China's Agenda 21:
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The distribution of China's energy resources do not mesh with the
distribution of economic activities, since nearly 80% of energy reserves are
located in the western and northern parts of the country, while 60% of
energy is consumed by the economically advanced southeastern part of the
country.211
This can be overcome by either of two ways. For solid fuels, such as coal or oil,
the fuel can be transported to the source of demand and then converted to electricity. The
other method, which can be applied to virtually any energy source, is to construct a power
plant near the energy source, then transmit electricity to the source of demand. Both of
these options are severely limited by China's aging infrastructure. No country in history
has undergone the sustained level of growth that China has seen over the last twenty
years. A lesson to be learned from China's experience is the importance of infrastructure
investment keeping pace with growth. The failure of this in China has resulted in severe
limitations on distribution of all goods in the country, and energy is just one area that
feels the pinch.
a) Transportation
The largest deficiency in China's infrastructure is its antiquated
transportation system. Due to the geographical mismatch of energy supply and demand,
transportation is key to meeting energy needs throughout the country. Today, 42% of
China's rail capacity is dedicated to transporting coal, with approximately 650 million
tons (Mtons) moved annually. 212 In recent years, a lack of sufficient rail assets has meant
211
"Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption," in Agenda 21, Chapter 13, 3.
212 McCrearyetal, 11-31.
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vast quantities of coal go into storage at mine sites awaiting transit. The U.S. DOE
estimates that 80 Mtons are currently awaiting transit with another 20 Mtons added
annually. On the other end of the rail lines, Chinese industries have occasionally had to
slow production due to coal shortages. 213 Also, as mentioned earlier, a great deal of coal
is used inappropriately throughout China, directly due to a rail shortage.
Coal is not the only source of energy effected by this shortage. The impact
of the inadequate rail service connecting Xinjiang Province with central China on oil
production in the Tarim Basin has already been discussed. It is only now able to keep up
with current demand, with 60-70% of all rail traffic travelling in or out of Xinjiang
carrying oil or related equipment. If the Tarim Basin ever proves to have the level of
reserves that China hopes (and desperately needs), this line will be completely
overwhelmed.
The majority of oil, however, travels not by rail, but pipeline. China's
existing system of pipelines, which comprises over 10,000 km of pipe, was sufficient to
distribute the relatively static oil production from the northeastern oil fields. When oil
production began to increase in Xinjiang, and the limits of the rail system became
apparent, it was soon realized that the pipeline system was out of date. A first step was
taken in 1994 when construction began on a 1000 km pipeline to connect Xinjiang to
213 As mentioned in the secUon on coal supply, the country adapted to this situation through a variety
of means, largely the creation of thousands of small coal mines. This has led to an overall surplus of coal in
China, and exacerbated the improper usage of high grade ores.
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Sichuan to help overcome the dificiency. This will allow production in the Tarim to
further increase, though this pipeline will likely rapidly reach maximum capacity.
China's deficient railway has led to increased reliance on imports, even for
commodities that China can produce internally. The exchange of oil imports and exports
discussed in an earlier chapter is one example of this phenomenon. Many high-demand
regions in southeastern China find it cheaper and more reliable to import oil and coal than
to depend on the country's indigenous supply. If China were to build more natural gas
power plants, particularly in these same provinces, liquid natural gas (LNG) imports
would be the only short-term way to support them. This is one of the factors that keeps
China from switching to gas.
Aware of these problems, the Chinese have been building railways at a
furious pace, laying 6000 km of new line, 3500 km of which was double track, between
1990-1995. This rapid increase was possible because it was largely replacing or
upgrading antiquated track. Laying new track in unprepared terrain will be significantly
more difficult and expensive. Yet, the Chinese have shown the capacity for building as
much as 3000-4000 km of new track a year at a cost of approximately $3.4 -$4.6 billion
(U.S.). The ninth five-year plan allocates $34 billion over five years to the railways, with
$24 billion of that for track construction, indicating the importance of the railways to
China's leaders. Despite this level of commitment, it will be several years before China
catches up with current nation-wide demand, let alone future needs. In addition to the
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shortage of rail, China is also woefully short on rolling stock (both engines and cars), and
much of what they have is antiquated (some engines are still coal-fired).
Rail is the primary freight mover for energy related fuels, but road
transportation is also an enabler of economic development. As China grows, "highways
and roads are increasingly important for freight transport, especially for short-distance
transport of goods. Its share in the total freight volume increased from 3% in 1978 to
15% in 1993."214 Road transport is also gaining in importance as a passenger mover,
relieving China's rail system of some of this burden. A sign of this, came in 1990, when
for the first time, highways moved more people than railways.
The growing number of cars and trucks in China has already been
discussed, but road construction is not keeping pace. For road transport to relieve any
significant strain from the railways, the level of investment must increase. Some regions
are more aware of this need than others, and Joyce Man demonstrated that there is a
positive correlation between each region's level of investment and GDP growth.215 Man
summarized the need well by saying:
As China's transportation infrastructure lags behind all developed
countries, a much greater investment effort will be necessary in the
transport sector to catch up with the backlog of present needs as well as
accommodate a sharp increase in demand. Failure to do so may stifle
economic growth.216
214 Joyce Y. Man, 'Transportation Infrastructure and Regional Development in China," International




Some of these lessons appear to be finding an understanding ear with Zhu
Rongji. He seems to have set out to turn this challenge into an opportunity by using
increased infrastructure investment to help spur the economy in the fourth quarter of 1998
back onto the path towards 8% growth. 217 This is a step in the right direction, but must
be sustained over the long haul, and not be seen as a gimmick to boost the economy. 218
One last transportation infrastructure shortage affecting China's energy
future is a shortage of adequate port facilities to handle coal exports or gas and oil
imports. This does not directly effect the exploitation of China's indigenous energy
supplies so a detailed analysis will be omitted. It is, however, a glaring obstacle to
increasing distribution along the coast or to bringing in the increased amounts of oil that
will be needed, or LNG if that route is pursued. Most of China's ports are all working at
maximum capacity, primarily as freight export ports, and though construction is
proceeding all over the coast, it is having difficulty keeping up with demand. There are
numerous upgrades planned, but they will likely be inadequate.219
217
"China Economy: Plan to Raise $24.4bn for Infrastructure," The Economist Intelligence Unit
(September 30, 1998), Available [Online]: Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/CURNWS/China and
transportation [October 14, 1998]; "China-Infrastructure Investment Helps Fulfill Growth Goal," China
Daily, FT Asia Intelligence Wire (October 12, 1998), Available [Online]: Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/
CURNWS/China and transportation [October 14, 1998]; "China-Investment in Transportation Infrastructure
to Rise," Asiainfo Daily China News, FT Asia Intelligence Wire (October 6, 1998), Available [Online]:
Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/CURNWS/China and transportation [October 14, 1998].
218 The likely success of this measure in boosting the economy is suspect at best. See "China-
Consumption Decisive, Too," China Daily, FT Asia Intelligence Wire (October 8, 1998), Available
[Online]: Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/CURNWS/China and transportation [October 14, 1998].
219 Data on China's port capacities and usage can be found in China Statistical Yearbook 1995
(Beijing: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, August 1995), 484-485. For some
examples of expansion plans, see "China Project: Qinzhou Port to Build 10 Oil/Gas Wharves," Nationwide
Financial News, Asia Pulse (August 19, 1998); "China Qingdao Port to Handle 100 Million Tons of Cargo
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b) China 's Electricity Infrastructure
An alternative open to many countries for overcoming transportation
deficiencies would be to emphasize mine-mouth construction of power plants to situate
power plants at the fuel source, thereby eliminating the transportation need. From this
arrangement, power can be transmitted to wherever it is needed. While China is pursuing
this route to alleviate some of the burden on the rail system, the capacity that can be
shifted will reach another limit due to the country's poor electrical transmission
infrastructure. This route may solve some regional problems, but it is not a viable option
for absorbing greatly increased national demand, because the country has no
interconnected national power grid. The present electrical distribution system consists of
six regional power grids and seven provincial grids.220 There are some interconnections
between some of these, but only for emergency power transfer. These are incapable of
supporting any massive redistribution of power.
This situation is changing slowly, but it will be many years before this
obstacle is overcome. In 1990, there was approximately $808 million (U.S.) spent on
power grid construction. Since then, between 15 and 25 percent of the annual
per Year," China Business Information Network, FT Asia Intelligence Wire (July 10, 1998), Available
[Online]: Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASLAPC/ CURNWS/China and shipping [October 15, 1998]; "Business in
Asia Today-July 17, 1998," Asia Pulse (July 17, 1998). For a discussion of one of the barriers to further
development of this sector, see Wong Joon San, "Mainland Needs More Foreign Money to Add Capacity,
Says Researcher; Ports Seek Overseas Investment," South China Morning Post, (June 22, 1998): Freight





expenditures on the electrical sector have been for grid improvements. China's goal is to
have the entire system interconnected by 2020. One reason for this delay is that the
current plan to integrate the grids relies on the completion of the Three Gorges Dam to
power much of central China. Until this plan is completed, regional power shortages will
continue to be routine, and it will not be feasible to fully exploit energy opportunities in
remote areas. The challenge for Beijing is meeting needs in high demand areas until then.
But completion of these plans will still not mean that every corner of China will have
access to grid supplied power. There will still be isolated pockets of the country that
must turn to local solutions.
Another key part of China's electricity infrastructure that has not really
been addressed in this thesis is the rapid rate of construction of new power plants. The
recent growth has been nothing short of phenomenal. While the energy sector has grown
at an average of 3-5% over the last two decades, the power sector has averaged 8%
growth. China has increased electrical generation capacity an average of 15 GW each
year. This is equivalent to building a new 565 MW power plant every two weeks. 221
This has been possible because China opened the market for limited
participation by foreign companies and investors. This has increased the capital available
and accelerated the rate of construction. This practice is continuing with the expectation
that roughly 20% of the $8 bn (U.S.) needed each year to finance future construction will
221 Logan et al, 2.
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come from outside sources. 222 Construction will continue in the coming years, and this
will not be a constraining factor on China's energy. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the
financing involved and cost-benefit analysis of the various types of plants will not be
completed here. 223 The important factor for this thesis is that the decision as to what type
of fuel these plants will use, will be driven by security concerns more than economic
ones. Many analysts point out the benefits of natural gas or increased usage of
renewables as either less expensive, or more environmentally sound alternatives to
China's current energy use patterns. These arguments, while persuasive, neglect the all
important security concern. The prices China is willing to pay for oil and gas reserves
show that economic arguments are less important to Beijing than security concerns.224
Choices made on this basis will have more to do with whether or not China can meet
future energy needs than with the relative costs of various fuels.
2. Energy Prices as a Barrier to Development
One obvious reminder of China's long standing planned economy is the existence
of price subsidies and artificially fixed prices in some sectors. The reforms begun in
1978 have gradually adjusted many prices to market levels, but China still feels the need
222 This dependence on outside assistance has been mentioned. It can be reconciled with the fear of
outside influence in that China realizes that once the plants are built, the country will not lose them should
the international situation deteriorate. This is not likely a supply contract that could be suspended.
223 An excellent review of the comparative costs of various electricity options open to China is
available in Logan et al.
224 Refer back to Rashid and Saywell for a review of China's aggressive bidding practices.
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to "protect" key industries. The energy sector is one notable example. As discussed,
China needs to further develop its energy industry to fully exploit indigenous resources.
It has viewed artificially set prices for oil and gas as keys to allowing this industry to
grow. The practice is also seen as supporting other state owned enterprises (SOE's) by
providing energy at below market prices. This practice does not end up helping the
energy industry, and it is in fact quite counterproductive. As the World Bank stated in
1993:
The current price system interferes with balanced sectoral
development by discouraging investment in precisely the designated
priority sectors in China's industrial policy. State-set prices prevent those
sectors from accumulating their own resources, forcing planners to
counteract this through administratively arranged transfers.225
The effect of this price fixing is most easily seen in the natural gas industry. This
subject has already been touched on, but the basic problem is that the internal price of gas
is fixed too low to provide much incentive for desperately needed outside investment in
the industry. A further effect is that the industry ends up subsidizing other under-
performing SOE's by selling them gas or oil at unreasonably low prices, thus depriving
the oil and gas industry of capital to finance its own expansion. These two effects
together cause under investment in the industry, which results in production growth that
is inadequate to support demand.226
225 The World Bank, China: The Achievement and Challenge ofPrice Reform (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, March 1993), 10.
226 See Logan and Chandler, "Natural Gas Gains Momentum;" Logan and Chandler, "Incentives
Needed for Foreign Participation in China's Natural Gas Sector;" Paik and Quan; "China's Gas Quest;"
"China: It Takes Just One Spark;" and David Blumenthal and Gary Susser, "Fuel for the Next Century,"
China Business Review (July-August 1998): 393-394.
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This has the added consequence of limiting development in other areas of the
energy sectors aside from oil and gas. The limits of China's oil and gas production make
it desirable to encourage development in alternative power sources, many of which have
been discussed. This is, however, discouraged by the low oil and gas prices, as it is not
economically viable to invest in more expensive resources. Tragically, it is only through
further investment in these industries that their costs will decrease to the point of being
competitive options for large-scale applications. 227
Beijing is finally recognizing the negative impact of the price fixing policy, and is
taking steps to correct it—but only for oil and oil products. Starting in June 1998, the
government implemented a new pricing system that is designed to gradually bring prices
somewhat in line with international market prices. The new system is extremely complex
and it is too early to assess its success.228 Unfortunately, this will not completely solve
the oil industry's problems.
One obstacle that will remain is that the current international oil prices are near
historic lows. When oil can be obtained cheaply from the open market, it is difficult to
encourage investment in expensive exploration of areas like the Tarim Basin or the South
China Sea. This situation is beyond Beijing's control, however, and the recent reforms
are at least a sign of progress. There are no such signs for natural gas. This is the
227 For a discussion of the effect of low oil and gas prices on the development of renewable
technology, see Li, Wan, and Ohi, 393-394.
228 A review of the new pricing system can be found in "China's Oil Price Reforms a Major Step in
Deregulating its Petroleum Sector," Oil and Gas Journal 96, no. 32 (August 10, 1998): 46-48.
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industry that most desperately needs reform to spur rapid growth. This fuel has the most
untapped potential in China, and Beijing is squandering the opportunity to more fully
reform its energy sector.
3. Technology Limitations
China's extreme autarky movements of the 1960's and 1970's left China's energy
industry decades behind the developed world. This and a variety of supply issues, already
discussed, have led China's power generation sector to focus on tried and true, simple
technologies fired mostly by coal. Reform in this area has been slow.
The situation outlined in this thesis makes it desirable for China to diversify and
modernize its power industry by building larger, more efficient plants. China's lack of
experience in this field hampers the country's ability to fully exploit new opportunities.
In most areas, China has developed a reasonable level of technical expertise, but this is
not always sufficient. The most notable example is the previously mentioned inability of
the country's SOE's to manufacture high capacity (greater than 600 MW) turbines for use
in either thermal, nuclear, hydropower, or wind power plants. Those items that the
country can produce are often done so with poor quality control and management, thus
limiting the dependability of the industry. This is most pronounced in those areas that
require "state-of-the-art" technology, like renewables.229
China's solution has been the same across many sectors, and the energy sector is
just one of many to tackle this problem. The path chosen is to embark on numerous
229 Discussed in Li, Wan, and Ohi.
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forms of joint ventures to obtain needed items or effect technology transfers. China's
huge market provides irresistible incentive for countless countries' industries. Most are
quite eager to provide whatever technical expertise is desired to carve out a niche in
China's market. U.S. policies that limit opportunities for U.S. firms (notably in the
civilian nuclear industry, though this could be changing if the US-China Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement ever goes into effect) do not restrain China's options, it merely
forces China to look to other countries for needed materials and technology.230 The only
ones punished by such measures are U.S. companies.
4. Security First
The final obstacle that will be addressed is China's emphasis on security above all
other considerations. This has been touched on throughout this thesis, and is in fact
central to the main argument of this work. Therefore, extensive elaboration is not
required. It is necessary here to simply highlight the role of security as an obstacle to
development.
Threads of this have been interwoven into each of the energy supply sections.
China's emphasis on security in its supply over other factors such as market availability,
affordability, or environmental impact, has prevented China's energy industry from
achieving the maximum possible growth. The most notable example is the vast potential
for natural gas power in China's coastal regions. LNG imports could be readily obtained
230 For more on the debate surrounding this agreement, see Congress, House, , Implementation of the
U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Whose Interests are Served?
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on the open market in ample quantities and at an affordable price to meet China's power
needs. 231 But this is a path not chosen, because fundamentally, China's "leaders are
uneasy about committing China to a fuel that must be imported."232 They are unhappy
about having to rely on imports for oil, but pragmatic enough to know this is unavoidable.
The country has no real reliance on natural gas, so if no dependence is developed, this is
one area where the need to import can be prevented.
The irony of this policy is that this focus on security is quite likely to undermine
China's security, rather than help ensure it. The effect of this approach is insufficient
demand to spur the internal development that could boost China's gas industry. This has
the end result of removing one strong contender for guaranteeing China has a dependable
supply of energy. This is where U.S. policy could play a role. It is imperative that the
U.S. acknowledge and address legitimate Chinese security needs and stop trying to
impose its will on Beijing. While true reliance on market solutions might solve China's
energy woes, this will not occur until China's leaders feel secure in such action.
B. OPPORTUNITIES
China's present energy situation can be seen as a dark cloud on the horizon, or it
can be viewed in a more positive light. It is clear that China cannot build its energy
industry as an exact copy of a Western developed country, because the country's resource
231 See "China: It Takes Just One Spark;" and Logan and Chandler, "Incentives Needed for Foreign
Participation in China's Natural Gas Sector."
232
"China: It Takes Just One Spark."
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base does not favor such a model. This is in one sense convenient, because China does
not want to be seen as directly copying any other country. China has the opportunity to
set a new example for development by pursuing different options. The country is already
doing this to the extent that it relies on less traditional power sources in rural areas. The
danger is that the country may see this as a liability and not as a strength.
To at least some extent, Beijing seems to be avoiding this trap. The ultimate
combination of energy sources in China's future will not follow any modern Western
model, nor will it follow any traditional Asian one. One thing that is certain is that the
end result will be uniquely Chinese. But to get there, the above mentioned obstacles must
be surmounted. The following sections will look at how this will be accomplished, as
well as some other options that should be considered.
1. Oil Imports
The net result of China's energy supply situation is that most needs can be met out
of indigenous sources, except for the rising demand for oil, and to a lesser extent, natural
gas. China's indigenous production simply cannot keep pace with the growing demand.
As shown in Chapter V, the annual gap between demand and supply will likely amount to
as much as 75 Mtons assuming low growth, and as much as 266 Mtons under high
growth. This can be put into context, by noting that China was a net exporter of crude oil
until 1996, and in that year, the net imports were only 2.3 Mtons. 233 Filling this gap will
233 Total imports were 22.62 Mtons (see Table. 4), and total exports were 20.33 Mtons. "Petroleum
Imports and Exports," China Petroleum News.
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mean increasing imports at the rate of over 5 Mtons annually under low growth, and
almost 19 Mtons annually under high growth. The total increase in net imports between
1995 and 1996 was only 4 Mtons. This should indicate the magnitude of required future
oil imports. Refer to Table 6. as the following sections examine possible sources for
China's future oil demand.
Country 1995 1996 Change 1996%
Indonesia 5278.8 6296.1 1017.3 27.8%
Vietnam 761.1 1006.9 245.8 4.5%
Malaysia 588.4 219.3 -369.1 1.0%
Papua New Guinea 334.8 471.4 136.6 2.1%
Australia 64.4 188.2 123.8 0.8%
Pakistan 49.4 0.0 -49.4 0.0%
Others 4.3 33.1 28.8 0.1%
Subtotal: Asia-Pacific 7081.2 8215.0 1133.8 36.3%
Oman 3653.2 5654.6 2001.4 25.0%
Yemen 2473.2 3765.7 1292.5 16.6%
Iran 931.2 2311.1 1379.9 10.2%
UAE 367.8 0.0 -367.8 0.0%
Saudi Arabia 338.6 230.6 -108.0 1.0%
Subtotal: Middle East 7764.0 11962.0 4198.0 52.9%
Angola 998.9 1662.4 663.5 7.4%
Nigeria 390.0 0.0 -390.0 0.0%
Libya 207.7 139.1 -68.6 0.6%
Algeria 130.4 0.0 -130.4 0.0%
Gabon 86.8 0.0 -86.8 0.0%
Others 25.6 125.5 99.9 0.6%
Subtotal: Western Africa 1839.4 1927.0 87.6 8.5%
Other Regions 400.8 512.9 112.1 2.3%
Total 17085.4 22616.9 5531.5 100.0%
Table 6. China's Oil Imports 1995-1996 (thousands of tons) 234
234 Adapted from "Petroleum Imports and Exports.
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a) Indonesia
China's traditional oil suppliers were its neighbors in Asia, principally
Indonesia. Today, that is the only country outside of the Middle East that currently
supplies China with quantities of oil large enough to indicate any capacity to absorb some
of the future demand. A member of OPEC, Indonesia is the largest oil producer in Asia
with estimated maximum annual production around 15 million barrels per day (bbl/d).235
That country's indigenous consumption is approximately 845,000 bbl/d leaving roughly
655,000 bbl/d available for export. Oil shipped to China currently amounts to almost
130,000 bbl/d, or approximately 19% of this total. 236 If Indonesia were to supply the
entire 5 Mtons additional required for the first year, the total exports to China would
amount to 75% of Indonesia's total. Beyond the first year, no more could be provided.
Further, it is doubtful that anywhere near that total would be made
available. A commitment to China on this scale would require Indonesia to virtually
abandon all of the country's other oil customers. It is unlikely that Indonesia would allow
itself to be that closely tied to China. This type of relationship might have been thinkable
under President Suharto, but President Habibie has made it clear that Chinese will receive
no special treatment under his administration.237
235 Information on Indonesia's oil industry is from "Indonesia Country Analysis Brief," U.S. EIA
(March 1998): 9, available [Online]: http://wvvw.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/indonesaJitml. [August 6, 1998]
236
1 ton=0.02031 barrels of oil per day. Conversion factor from "Glossary of Industry Terms," Shell
Oil Company, available [Online]: http://www.shell.eom/h/h9Jitml. [November 11, 1998]
237 Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia held a privileged position during the Suharto years, during which time
they amassed wealth far in excess of what their numbers would lead one to expect. These Chinese were the
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b) Middle East
The most obvious source for meeting oil demand on the scale facing
China, is the Middle East. That region's vast oil and gas reserves made it a mainstay of
U.S. oil supplies for decades. This began to change as the political situation in the region
began to threaten the predictability of oil from the region. In response to events in Iran,
Iraq, and other areas, the U.S. gradually shifted its dependence away from Persian Gulf
oil. Today, though the U.S. is dependent on oil for 40% of its primary energy needs, and
half of that is from imports, America is the destination for only 10% of the region's oil
exports.238 However, 85% of the Gulfs oil goes to allies of the U.S. in Europe and
Japan. 239 Accordingly, the "United States has enduring interests in... maintaining the free
flow of oil [from the Persian Gulf] at reasonable prices."240
The U.S. commitment to the region has been demonstrated numerous
times, and is being reinforced even today. This level of U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf
has meant that China would rather not become heavily dependent on oil from this source.
There is the fear in Beijing that if relations with the U.S. were to deteriorate, the U.S.
"could use its dominant naval presence in the Gulf to cut Chinese oil supplies as a means
subject of much animosity and violence during the May 1998 riots, and Habibie has said that the Chinese
will no longer be protected and must fend for themselves. Considering this treatment of ethnic Chinese who
are actually Indonesian citizens, it is doubtful that Habibie will devote his country to serving the PRC.




of pressuring the PRC."241 According to John Calabrese, the Chinese view U.S. military
involvement in the Gulf as "interference," and they suspect the U.S. of wanting to
dominate the region as a means of exercising control over the Gulfs resources. 242 The
Chinese would like to see countries in the region "friendly to China and not amenable to
directives from China's enemies," whoever they may turn out to be.243
Nevertheless, Beijing is becoming more pragmatic in its foreign relations,
and China's leaders realize that the scope of their growing need for oil means that a large
portion of future imports must come from the Middle East. This is due to the region's
large proven reserves, idle capacity, and relatively low development and production
costs. 244 Faced with this reality, China has gradually increased its involvement in the
region over the last decade. 245
241 Jonathan Rynhold, "China's Cautious New Pragmatism in the Middle East," Survival 38, no. 3
(Autumn 1996): 102-116, specifically, 110.
242 John Calabrese, "China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security," Middle East Journal 52, no.3
(Summer 1998): 351-366, specifically 354.
243 This is labeled as the basic Chinese goal in the Middle East in Lillian Craig Harris, "Myth and
Reality in China's Relations with the Middle East," in Robinson and Shambaugh, 322-347, specifically 327.
Harris goes on to say that all other Chinese goals in the Middle East derive from this. The second premise
of China's actions in the region is that China desires "a Middle East free of external intervention, a region
which settles its difficulties internally....Third, China uses its relationships with Middle Eastern states and
organizations to enhance its authority in the developing world and, during the last decade, to further its
internal 'modernization' ambitions."
244 Calabrese, 356.
245 Calabrese provides an excellent review of China's increasing influence in the Persian Gulf, both
politically and economically. Most of the details in this section are from that source.
131
Prior to the Gulf War, China had established relations with all of the Gulf
countries (relations with Saudi Arabia were just established in 1990), and was becoming
increasingly involved in the Middle East peace process as a means to extend its influence.
The Gulf War left China in a difficult position, as the country was poised to profit from
oil in Iraq. Ultimately, China acquiesced in UN action in Iraq, though it fell short of total
endorsement, which led to the suspension of Kuwaiti development funds bound for
China. After the War, China gradually regained her position through such actions as the
reconstruction of a Kuwaiti oil refinery. In 1993, China began importing oil from Kuwait
for the first time, and agreed to triple its imports from Saudi Arabia.
By 1996, over half of China's total oil imports came from the region (see
Table 6.). This is expanding, as Beijing is entering into numerous deals for oil purchases,
joint oil production agreements, pipeline construction plans, and refinery supply
arrangements with Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.
The Gulf countries recognize the vast potential in China's market, and are scrambling to
obtain their share. Some examples include the Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC)
owning a 14.7% share of the Yacheng-13 gas field, and Saudi Arabian ARAMCO's
participation as the largest shareholder in the Thalin Refinery in China, as well as plans to
build a new refinery in Qingdao. Furthermore, China has become the leading customer of
both Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian fertilizers.
The reason for concern in the U.S. is that China does not share the U.S.
view of Iran and Iraq as rogue nations, and is willing to deal with them as much as the
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other Gulf states. China already imports oil from Iran, and a planned pipeline from
Kazakhstan includes a 1000 kilometer stretch that connects the Chinese controlled Uzen
oil field in Kazakhstan to the Persian Gulf where oil can be shipped back to China. This
route travels directly through Iran, providing that nation with increased access to world
markets. In Iraq, China has laid the groundwork to develop the Ahdab oilfield, and is
positioned to begin production as soon as UN sanctions are lifted.
As the U.S. stake in Gulf oil decreases and China's increases, the stage is
set for competing loyalties among the Gulf nations. If this trend continues, it might
become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to obtain regional support for actions against
Iran and Iraq, especially if China does not support such moves. While the U.S. would
like to isolate these countries, both diplomatically and economically, the size of the
Chinese market makes the latter difficult to do without Chinese support, and China's veto
power on the UN Security Council makes the former somewhat problematic. It is
unlikely that Beijing would eagerly agree to any further sanctions on either of these two
nations when China is poised to profit from their reentering the international community.
Such a competition of wills would leave the Gulf States in a difficult position, and the
result may not always be what the U.S. would like.
c) Central Asia
In its drive to diversify supply and minimize the negative aspects of
expanding dependence on current suppliers, China has been looking to new areas for oil
and gas. The most promising of these is Central Asia. This area, together with the
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Transcaucasia region across the Caspian Sea, contains almost 4% of the world's proven
oil reserves and almost 6% of the gas reserves. 246 This represents vast potential that has
only begun to be tapped with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Yet, while the region is rich in potential, "economic dislocations caused by
the collapse of the Soviet era logistical relations and the transition to a market economy
have... left governments with insufficient funds to develop these resources."247 The
largest barrier to development is the lack of any export transportation infrastructure. The
few pipelines that do exist in the region were built by the Soviet Union to serve Soviet
markets. Russia's current financial troubles, and the desire to promote its own oil and gas
industries means that this route has been essentially closed, at least as an export route.
Some oil and gas still flows, but only to Russia, and not for sale at market prices.248
This situation presented the perfect opportunity for China. The Central
Asian Republics have oil and gas, which they desperately need to bring to market to
provide capital to develop their countries. China is a rapidly developing country, which is
thirsty for oil and gas. This has led to a marriage of convenience between China and
Kazakhstan for oil, and between China and Turkmenistan for gas. In 1997, China's
CNPC outbid several Western competitors and obtained exclusive development rights to
246
"Caspian Sea Overview," IEA, Available [Online]: http://www.iea.org/pubs/studies/iiles/caspian/
overviewJitm: 1-2. [October 27, 1998]
247 Ibid, 5.
248 For more on the Caspian situation, see "Caspian Sea Overview." Also James P. Dorian et al,
"Energy Investment and Trade Opportunities Emerging in Central Asia, Northwest China," Oil and Gas
Journal 96, no. 24 (June 15, 1998): 48-60; and International Energy Outlook 1998, Appendix C.
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the Uzen oil field and a major position in the Atyrau oil field, both in western
Kazakhstan. The first shipment of Kazakh oil reached China's Xinjiang Province via rail
on October 21, 1997. 249 As already outlined, China's rail system is inadequate to support
any huge influx of oil shipments through this region. Therefore, this system cannot be the
ultimate method for bringing this oil to China's markets. There are two viable options:
transport the oil by ship, or construct new pipelines.
Transport by ship is a traditional method, and one which China will use to
some extent. The difficulty with this option is that to simply bring Kazakh oil to a viable
seaport will still require some pipeline construction, either to the Black Sea or the Persian
Gulf. The U.S. and other Western nations are backing the Black Sea option as this will
provide a method for bringing the oil to European and American markets. China prefers
the Persian Gulf option as this is much closer to China. The Black Sea option is the plan
put forward by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and backed by most countries in
the region.250 This travels overland to the Russian port of Novorossiisk. Kazakhstan
prefers other alternatives, because after nearly 75 years of Soviet control, the country
wishes to reduce dependence on Russia.251 China answered Kazkhstan's fears by
249 Dorian et al, 56.
250 For more on the various pipeline proposals in the region, see "Caspian Sea Overview," 9-13;
Dorian et al, 57-59; Elshan Alekberov, "Despite Political Obstacles, Energy Work Progresses Around
Caspian Sea," Oil and Gas Journal 96, no. 24 (June 15, 1998): 38-47, specifically 40-41; and International
Energy Outlook 1998, Appendix C.
251 Dilip Hiro, "Kazakhstan/China: Border Pact Removes Last Hurdle to New Ties," Inter Press
Service (July 7, 1998), Available [Online]: Mead LFJCIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/CURNWS/China and Kakhstan.
[October 15, 1998]
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proposing two pipelines. The first will bring Uzen oil to the Persian Gulf via Iran, and
the second will be a direct line to Xinjiang. These are depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. China's Pipeline Plans249
The route through Iran was discussed in the section on the Middle East.
The overland route to China seems quite positive, and can be seen as reasonably secure to
China. However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the rail and pipeline infrastructure
connecting Xinjiang to the rest of China cannot support drastic increases in volume. This
is adding further incentive to upgrade the pipeline system throughout China. This is an
enormous undertaking, which Beijing finally seems determined to start. The first major
step is a plan to further enhance the scope of the proposed pipeline to Xinjiang, increasing
the total pipe laid to 4,200 km. 250 This project, once completed, should be sufficient to
249 From Rashid and Saywell, 48.
250
"China to Lay $2.4 bin East-West Oil Pipeline," Asia Pulse (November 2, 1998).
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meet demand well into the next century. A similar 6,700 km pipeline is planned to bring
gas from Turkmenistan to China (also depicted in Figure 4.), though this plan is not as
well developed.254
d) Russia
This massive cooperation between China and the Central Asian Republics
is making Moscow nervous. Despite these countries recently becoming independent
states, Russia still considers the region part of its "sphere of influence" and does not like
to see its former "protectorates" developing strong alliances and economic independence
along Russia's southern border. 255 China is aware of Russian concerns and is being quite
proactive in addressing them. This is another display of pragmatism, because Beijing
recognizes that Russia, too, has vast oil and gas potential.
That potential was one of the motives that drove Beijing and Moscow to
declare a strategic partnership in April 1996.256 Despite conflicting goals in Central Asia,
Russia and China need each other almost as badly as China and the Central Asian
Republics. In some ways, Russia is an even better source of gas. Though Turkmenistan
254 Andrey Kirillov, "Turkment President Urges China to Exploit Oil Deposits," ITAR-TASS (1641
GMT, September 2, 1998), FBIS Document ID FTS 199809034001285.
255 This is discussed in Rashid and Saywell, but is a recurring theme, raised recently in Christopher
Bluth, "Russia and China Consolidate Their New Strategic Partnership," Jane's Intelligence Review 10, no.
8 (August 1, 1998), Jane's Information Group Limited: 8. This article highlights commonalities between




has proven gas reserves of over 100 tcf, this is compared to Russia's proven reserves of
1,700 tcf. 257 Turkmenistan's estimated gas production in 1996 was only 1.31 tcf, though
the country has demonstrated potential to produce almost 3 tcf per year. 258 This reduced
level is due to decreased demand from Russia. Yet, these numbers are compared to
Russia's estimated 1997 production of 20.2 tcf.
To tap into this potential, China has proposed a pipeline from Siberia to
China's northeastern provinces, with possible extensions to service Japan and Korea (See
Figure 4.).259 This pipeline would only need to be approximately 1000 km to reach
China's markets, making this option easier and less expensive to construct, with a greater
potential for gas shipments. This is not viewed as an alternative by Beijing, but rather a
supplement to other plans. China is pursuing many options simultaneously to further
diversify its supplies. This is one large step towards ensuring supply.
2. Joint Ventures and Overseas Acquisitions
To help assuage security concerns, Beijing has taken a new approach to obtaining
some of its oil from abroad. Rather than rely on purchase agreements, China has become
very aggressive in recent years about actually acquiring oil reserves overseas. CNPC has
257 The abbreviation tcf is trillion cubic feet. 1 cubic meter is equal to 37.3 cubic feet (Shell Oil
Company web page). These numbers are from the Turkmenistan and Russia Country Analysis Briefs of the
U.S. EIA, Available [Online]: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkmeniitml and http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html. [November 12, 1998]
258 The estimated potential is given in Dorian et al, 51.
259 For more on the proposed pipeline linkages in northeast Asia, see Paik and Quan; also Arlon R.
Tussing, "Potential Boom Taking Shape In Developing Northeast Asian Natural Gas Supply Network," Oil
and Gas Journal 96, no. 27 (July 6, 1998): 27-33; and Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia."
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become a major player among world oil companies by outbidding all competitors for
reserves in Central Asia, South America, Sudan, and other places. China views owning
the oil as more secure than simply buying it on the open market, because this type of
supply can only be cut off by extreme measures.
Additionally, this makes China a major investor in many of these countries. This
connects these states and China economically, and makes it less likely that any of these
states would automatically side with the U.S. or any other major power who had a
disagreement with China and wanted to isolate it. Such an event may be unlikely, but as
China and the U.S. are obtaining oil from many of the same places, interaction is
inevitable. Based on the Chinese assumption that Western powers still want to keep
China weak so it can be exploited, it is logical that China would take steps to be more
secure in its supplies in these regions than the United States. By owning the reserves,
China believes it is less likely to be affected by U.S. influence.
Some of these overseas deals have been discussed, specifically those in Central
Asia. To obtain the rights to the Uzen field, CNPC bid 30% higher than its nearest
competitor.260 Many U.S. companies were vying for that contract, and this experience
highlighted one cause for concern about China's energy policy. U.S. firms must comply
with U.S. political restrictions designed to isolate countries like Iran and Iraq. China does
not abide by such rules, and sees U.S. efforts to influence events in these countries as
interference. In the Uzen deal, this difference helped clinch the deal for China. One part
260 See Rashid and Saywell, 46.
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of the package CNPC offered Kazakhstan was the two pipelines previously mentioned.
This provides the Kazakhs with export channels free from Russian influence. The
pipeline through Iran is particularly attractive as this provides access to the Persian Gulf
and markets in other Asian countries.
Central Asia is not the only place where Chinese gains have come at the expense
of U.S. oil companies. In Venezuela—which is the largest supplier of U.S. oil imports
—
China beat out U.S. bidders again. This time, CNPC nearly doubled bids by U.S. oil
companies, and for a price of $358 million (U.S.), obtained the rights to two separate
blocks with estimated oil reserves of 100 Mtons.261 The prices China is paying, and the
expensive pipelines planned show the importance China is placing on securing diverse
supplies. This reinforces the importance of security over affordability to China. With
this approach as a modus operandi, it is doubtful that any other competitor can stand in
China's way of obtaining reserves it desires. In the event that some country tried, the
myriad of avenues China is pursuing should guarantee continuous flow of oil from
somewhere, except in dire circumstances.
3. East and South China Seas
If such dire circumstances did occur, either due to foreign intervention or the
complete failure of many overseas ventures, Beijing will look to other areas to meet its
energy needs. A region that would begin to look more promising is the waters of the East
and South China Seas. There has been much written about the disputes in the Spratly
261 For more on this and other CNPC overseas acquisitions, see Rashid and SayweU.
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Islands, and to a lesser extent the Diayou Islands, therefore only a brief review of the
disagreements is necessary here.262 The aspect of both disputes that is significant to this
discussion is that both areas are believed to hide huge oil and gas reserves.
The Spratlys are the area that is most likely to appear valuable, even though the
true extent of any reserves in the area is a complete unknown. China is just one of six
countries that claims all or part of these islands. There has been much rhetoric thrown
about and even some shots fired over the years. All sides see these islands as valuable
and are unwilling to back down. "At this stage hopes, rather than solid evidence, of vast
oil and gas reserves seem to be driving the action," and these hopes are huge.263 Chinese
sources have been quoted as saying that they expect oil and gas reserves in the area to be
worth an estimated $1 trillion (U.S.).264 Yergin, Eklof, and Edwards note that estimates
of the oil reserves range from 6 to 105 billion barrels.265 It is widely believed that the
natural gas reserves exceed 65 trillion cubic meters, and may possibly contain another 25-
50 trillion cubic meters. 266
262 These are the two disputed areas in the region that China is most likely to view as having
hydrocarbon potential on such a scale to warrant risking political fallout. For a discussion of some other
possibilities, see Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia."
263 Susumu Awanchara, 'Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economic Review 155, no. 32 (August 13,
1992), 16.
264 Ibid.
265 Yergin, Eklof, and Edwards, 48.
266 Ibid. For a detailed analysis of the undersea geography and oil exploration efforts in the region, see
Mark J. Valencia, South-East Asian Seas: Oil Under Troubled Waters, Hydrocarbon Potential,
Jurisdictional Issues, and International Relations (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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China has stayed involved in the islands, but has not been too forceful about its
claims. If other options are shut off, the potential size of the resources in the area could
drive China to consider becoming more aggressive about its rights in the area. The
legality of these rights is somewhat vague, but so are the claims of all the other nations
involved. The lack of clarity over the true legal status of these islands has led the U.S. to
take a "hands off approach to the whole affair.
If the situation escalated, many fear the U.S. would be dragged into the dispute
because of the islands' strategic location near the major sea-lanes of the South China Sea.
Almost all ships bound for Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea pass through this region
carrying vital commodities, including over 70% of the oil and gas bound for these three
countries. 267 Any disruption of this traffic would require a U.S. response under the
current security guarantees to all three of these nations. 268
The U.S. security guarantees to Japan are also a concern when examining the
Diayou dispute. This island chain is the subject of competing claims by China, Taiwan,
and Japan, who is the current controller of the chain. Once again, potential oil and gas
reserves seem to be a motivating factor behind the dispute. While no major exploration
267 Yergin, Eklof, and Edwards, 49.
268 por a reference to the importance of this area to the U.S., see "Prepared Statement of Stanley O.
Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for the House International Relations
Committee, Asian and the Pacific Subcommittee," Federal News Service, (May 7, 1998), Available
[Online]: Mead LEXIS/NEXIS/ASIAPC/ALLNWS/SpraUy Islands
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has been conducted in the islands, many believe the hydrocarbon potential may exceed
thatoftheSpratlys.269
These areas are both encompassed by a very vague line drawn as part of China's
1992 Territorial Sea Law. This controversial law seemed to claim the entire East and
South China Seas as Chinese territorial waters. Beijing's true intention with this law has
never been fully clarified, but it is likely that the intent was to provide a basis for China to
claim rights to any resources found in the area. In the past few years, Chinese officials
have declined to elaborate on their claims, and there has been no incident to test their
resolve. If China feels that possible resources in the area might be worth any politcal
costs, this law could be given new teeth. This is a very unlikely scenario, but it could
become less so depending on the success of China's other overseas ventures.
269 See Nathan and Ross, 155-1 18. For a discussion of the issues surrounding this dispute, see Alan J.
Day (ed.), Border and Territorial Disputes, 2nd edition (Essex, UK: Longman Group Ltd, 1987), 286-287.
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Vin. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
This thesis has explored two possible future scenarios for China's energy industry:
high and low growth. The general trend is that if low growth occurs, China's actions will
likely continue on a course quite similar to the one apparent today. There will be some
changes in the energy sector, but overall needs can be met. If the high growth occurs,
China will be faced with drastically increased oil and gas imports, and Beijing may fear
the security implications that result from this dependence. This scenario could lead to
tensions in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South China Sea.
Fortunately, while China's economy is still growing, the rate of growth appears to
be slowing. At the same time, the country is emphasizing efficiency and conservation.
These efforts will help reduce the overall demand for energy supplies and slow the rate of
growth in the energy industry. This makes the low growth scenario the most likely to
occur. Even so, there will be an increase in demand for oil and gas imports that will have
China interacting more frequently in world energy markets. Where there is interaction,
there is always the possibility for disagreements. The U.S. must be sensible in dealing
with China to keep Beijing comfortable with dependence on the world market. If
disagreements are allowed to become conflicts, any alternative avenues that China may be
likely to choose will be much more damaging to U.S. interests.
In the next few years, China's energy situation will evolve slightly. Oil is
becoming increasingly important, and its share of TCEC will likely increase. This
increase will be met by imports. Natural gas will also increase its share of TCEC though
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very slowly. This could be accelerated, and most observers would like to see this done.
The main barrier to this is China's emphasis on security above other concerns. This has
led to actions that prevent China's indigenous gas industry from realizing its potential.
These fuels will be in such high demand for industrial, transportation, and residential uses
that they will not be available to assume greater shares of electrification.
In the electrical sector, China will continue to experience phenomenal growth
rates. The share of capacity met by the various fuel sources will change slightly as
nuclear power and hydropower increase their relative contributions. Commercial
renewables will be unlikely to assume any significant portion of demand. However, these
options need to be pursued as an avenue for relieving pressure to expend other fuel
sources in rural areas. This can help keep the commercial energy growth rate near the
low growth side.
The U.S. can assist China's electrical sector by further encouraging U.S. firms to
participate in hydropower and nuclear plant construction. These are two areas that stand
a realistic chance of increasing their percentage of TCEC, thereby reducing usage of coal.
If planned goals are met in these two areas, the need to bum almost 70 Mtons of coal per
year will be averted. These offer the best short-term chance for lessening China's impact
on the environment. Fears of proliferation from peaceful nuclear power need to be
overcome, and actions taken to encourage the growth of these industries. While many in
the U.S. would like to see the role of nuclear power diminished in favor of natural gas
power, this is not going to happen for many years in China. The U.S. should relax
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restrictions on technology transfers for such items as high capacity power turbines, which
can allow China to meet demand.
At the same time, the U.S. should step up its efforts to aid the Chinese in
developing energy efficient technologies and practices. There are already many ventures
in this area. One example can be found in Climate Change Mitigation: Case Studies from
China.270 This review of efforts by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) provides an
idea of the type of projects that can succeed in China given sufficient support. The U.S.
needs to be one of these sources of support.
This program aids not only in reducing consumption but also, as the title implies,
reducing environmental impact. This area will be the big challenge of the future. As
China struggles to meet energy needs, coal will continue to play a dominant role. The
U.S. needs to be proactive in encouraging China to adopt emission reduction
technologies. To enable this, the U.S. will probably have to provide extensive assistance
through the form of government subsidized corporate participation. U.S. firms are world
leaders in developing technology in this area, but to encourage China to adopt these
systems, demonstration units will likely have to be provided throughout the country. As
local officials begin to see the possibilities, demand will likely grow.
Specifically applicable to coal use, the U.S. should provide extensive assistance to
China in developing technology to lower sulfur content all through the coal usage cycle.
270 Climate Change Mitigation: Case Studies from China, AISU, Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (October 1997), Available [Online]: http://www.pnl.gov/china/chinacsf.pdf. [November 12,
1998]
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An example of some programs that should be exported can be found in Clean Coal
Technology: Upgrading of Low-Rank Coals.111 These programs offer great potential in
China where there is a great deal of low quality coal ore.
In summary, then, these suggestions represent little more than an extension of
current Clinton administration approaches to China. Engagement is obviously the only
real option. The question then becomes what form of engagement. Specifically, the U.S.
must be as pragmatic as Beijing is becoming. China is going to get the energy it needs
because this is a priority to the government. The U.S. has the power to treat China like a
friend and help guide that country's transition to market dependence. Like all
friendships, disagreement is inevitable, but this does not have to scuttle the benefits of
continued relations. If the U.S. chooses to emphasize the differences between the two
countries, and attempts to coerce China into desired behavioral patterns, the chance of
success is slim. Nor are such efforts necessary. China is slowly evolving, and further
engagement in the world economy can only accelerate this.
China's actions are not necessarily threatening to U.S. interests. A developed
China is in everyone's interests, as this represents a large prosperous market. It also
means that China will be more likely to transition to modern manufacturing methods and
newer power plant designs which will reduce environmental degradation. But changes
like these will only occur if China feels secure in relying on world markets for energy. If
the U.S. and other countries see China's growth as threatening, China will likely react by
271 Clean Coal Technology: Upgrading ofLow-Rank Coals, U.S. DOE Fossil Energy Topical Report
no. 10 (August 1997), Available [Online]: http://wvvTv.fe.doe.gov. [November 10, 1998]
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retrenching in traditional methods and by pursuing claims in the South China Sea and
other areas. Essentially, as Jeffrey Bader, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, stated: "to treat China as an enemy is to ensure that it will behave as
one."272 Bader went on to summarize the benefits of comprehensive engagement with
China as follows:
Our policy of comprehensive engagement is designed to pursue
cooperation with China where appropriate while opposing those Chinese
actions and policies with which we disagree. At the same time, we keep
our eye on the long-term goal of bringing China firmly into the
international system as a responsible participant. Only through a policy
that engages China can we hope to accomplish these goals. We welcome a
secure, prosperous and open China. Such a China will be a constructive
member of the international community, and a valuable partner for the
United States.273
What this thesis advocates then, is a broadening of those areas of cooperation
deemed appropriate. U.S. policy tends to focus on proliferation concerns and
environmental degradation, without really presenting the Chinese with any viable
solutions. The U.S. must take the lead in helping China to find its way in the future
energy market by helping to increase that country's confidence in market solutions. The
true challenge will be in ensuring that policies are in place to continue such cooperation
over a change of administration. This is where the Clinton administration must strive to
272
"Bader on Sino-American Relations: U.S. Policy Options," Testimony by Jeffrey Bader, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the House International Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs (April 23, 1997), Available [Online]:
http://wvvw.pnl/gov/china/baderJitni, 1. [October 16, 1998]
273 Ibid, 3.
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build bipartisan support for engagement with China to prevent it from becoming a
political tool. This would benefit neither party, and the whole world would pay the price.
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